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Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy 
A Penny for the Court’s Thoughts? 
The High Price of Judicial Elections 
Bronson D. Bills∗
“[I]t was ‘never contemplated that the individual who has to protect our 
individual rights would have to consider what decision would produce the 
most votes.’”1
– Justice John Paul Stevens 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 When commenting on the importance of judicial independence, the great John 
Marshall once opined: “I have always thought, from my earliest youth till now that the 
greatest scourge an angry Heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful and sinning people, 
was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a dependent judiciary.”2  In keeping with that statement, 
this article undertakes an assessment of one of the most fundamental principles in the 
Anglo-American legal system: judicial independence.  It is a time-honored ideal that 
must be, in the words of Justice Brennan, “jealously guarded against outside 
interference.”3  Specifically, this article examines judicial elections, as currently used by 
some states across America today,4 and demonstrates how these elections, now more than 
                                                 
∗ Associate, Brayton & Purcell, Salt Lake City, Utah; written while clerking for the Honorable J. Thomas 
Greene, Senior Judge, United States District Court for the District of Utah.  [Editor’s Note: The author 
formerly clerked for Justice Nancy Saitta while she was a Nevada District Court Judge.]  This article is 
dedicated to my good friend and mentor Judge Lawrence J. Block, United States Court of Federal Claims.  
Once again, “if I have seen further than others, it is because I have stood on the shoulders of Giants.”  
Bronson D. Bills, Note, Does Jurisdiction Matter to the Tenth Circuit? Utahns for Better Transp. v. U.S. 
Dep’t. of Transp., 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 747, 747 (2004) (quoting Letter from Sir Isaac Newton to 
Robert Hooke, February 5, 1676, quoted in STEPHEN HAWKING, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: THE 
GREAT WORKS OF PHYSICS AND ASTRONOMY 725 (Stephen Hawking ed., Running Press Book Publishers 
2001) (2002)).  I would also like to thank Taylor Broadhead, J.D. Candidate 2010, Cornell Law School, for 
his research assistance.  All ideas, as well as errors, as the old saying goes, are my own. 
1 Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid Efforts to Intimidate and 
Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 310 (1997) (citing Justice 
John Paul Stevens, Opening Assembly Address, American Bar Association Annual Meeting 12 (Aug. 3, 
1996) (quoting Florida Supreme Court Justice Ben Overton) (on file with the New York University Law 
Review)). 
2 Jefferson B. Fordham & Theodore H. Husted, Jr., John Marshall and the Rule of Law, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 
57, 61 (1955) (quoting PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION OF 1829-30, at 
615-19 (1830)).  Other notable giants, such as ex-President William Taft, felt likewise.  See WILLIAM H. 
TAFT, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 6 (1913) (noting that judicial elections are inherently 
“disgraceful” and “so shocking . . . that we ought to condemn without stint a system which can encourage 
or permit such demagogic methods of securing judicial position”). 
3 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 409 (1989) (citing N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line 
Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60 (1982)). 
4 Currently, thirty-nine states use judicial elections to appoint some or all of their judges to the bench.  See 
Raymund A. Sobocinski, Adumbrations on Judicial Campaign Speech, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 193, 201-02 
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ever, jeopardize the autonomy of the courts, threaten individual liberties and erode the 
esteem of the judiciary in the eyes of the public.5  Judicial elections require judges to 
solicit contributions from donors who will likely appear before them in court—a fact that 
may influence a judge’s future decision making, and certainly, if nothing else, creates the 
appearance of judicial impropriety.6  Judicial elections also invite unqualified candidates 
with deep pockets to run for judgeships,7 “destroy[] the traditional respect for the 
bench,”8 and virtually guarantee that judges will base their decisions partially, if not 
completely, upon the vicissitudes of popular politics instead of the law.9  Accordingly, 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2006). 
5 See Thomas R. Phillips, Electoral Accountability and Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 137, 142 
(2003) (“Each election cycle, additional states experience divisive, expensive, agenda-driven campaigns, 
increasingly accompanied by independent expenditures from national interest groups.  The problem is now 
national in scope, and it demands national attention.  If we do nothing, we risk not just an erosion, but 
indeed a meltdown in respect for the courts and the rule of law.”); see also Mark A. Behrens & Cary 
Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 273, 309-10 (2002). 
6 Former Nevada Supreme Court Justice Bob Rose, who concurred in Guinn v. Nevada State Legislature, 
71 P.3d 1269 (Nev. 2003), overruled in part by Nevadans for Nev. v. Beers, 142 P.3d 339 (Nev. 2006), but 
decided to retire instead of run for reelection, “laments that judicial candidates must go out and hustle 
campaign contributions from lawyers and others who eventually may try cases before them.” Ed Vogel, 
Retiring Justice Laments Influence of Money: But He’s Hopeful Times are Changing, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., 
Dec. 26, 2006, at B5, available at http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2006/Dec-26-Tue-
2006/news/11558186.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2008).  Former Justice Rose continued: “I don’t think 
money changes a judge’s decision, but it gives a very bad perception to the average person. . . . You have a 
lawyer who gave a judge $10,000, and you have a lawyer who gave nothing.  Which lawyer do you want to 
make arguments for you?  Does money talk?  I don’t believe so, but it does create the perception of 
impropriety to many people.”  Id.  Although Justice Rose does not believe that “money talks” in Nevada, 
there is strong evidence to the contrary.  Indeed, prior to the Seat G election, several Nevada judges, 
including then-Judge Nancy Saitta (the winner of the Seat G race), were the subject of a Los Angeles Times 
article that demonstrated that numerous judges, including Saitta, not only heard cases involving campaign 
donors (a conflict of interest?), but also issued rulings that were favorable to the various campaign donors 
(another conflict of interest?).  See Michael J. Goodman & William C. Rempel, In Las Vegas, They’re 
Playing With a Stacked Judicial Deck, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 2006, at B5, available at 
http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-na-vegas8jun08,1,7420641.story (last visited Jan. 22, 2008). 
7 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788-89 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
8 Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 8 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 1, 23 (1956). 
9 See, e.g., White, 536 U.S. at 789 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Joseph R. Grodin, Developing a 
Consensus of Constraint: A Judge’s Perspective on Judicial Retention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969, 
1980 (1988) (when asked whether his election year decisions were influenced by the upcoming vote and 
public perception, California Supreme Court Justice Joseph Grodin candidly replied, “I just can’t be 
sure.”); JOHN H. CULVER & JOHN T. WOLD, JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE STATES 139, 156 (Anthony 
Champagne & Judith Haydel eds., University Press of America 1993) (in discussing a case he voted on 
prior to his upcoming election in 1982, Justice Otto Kaus of the California Supreme Court stated: “I 
decided the case the way I saw it.  But to this day, I don’t know to what extent I was subliminally 
motivated by the thing you could not forget—that it might do you some good politically to vote one way or 
the other.”); Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention Elections and Judicial Behavior, 77 JUDICATURE 
306, 313 (1994) (noting that judges’ fears that a “controversial case or opposition by some group, could stir 
voters to oust them.”); Robert S. Thompson, Judicial Retention Elections and Judicial Method: A 
Retrospective on the California Retention Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2007 (1988); see Deborah 
A. Agosti, My Life and the Law: A Short Overview, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 863, 881 (2005) (“I doubt that 
many judges now sitting on the bench in Nevada will be in a hurry in the future to make a legally sound 
decision that also happens to be repugnant to vocal political extremists.”).  Of course, when I speak of the 
need for judges to foot their decisions based upon “the law,” I am not suggesting that there is a chemical or 
mathematical formula that pre-determines the outcome of any given decision.  Rather, when I speak of 
basing decisions upon “the law,” I speak of a process whereby judges consider a variety of probative 
factors. 
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this article urges all states that employ judicial elections to abandon this precarious 
method of placing judges on the bench,10 as the American Bar Association (ABA),11 the 
Supreme Court of the United States,12 and legal commentators13 have urged time and time 
again.14 
¶2 At the crux of this article lies Nevada’s recent 2006 Supreme Court race for Seat 
G—another unfortunate judicial election that involves a new and dangerous twist.  In the 
race for Seat G on Nevada’s high court, incumbent Chief Justice Nancy Becker—who 
concurred in the controversial five to one constitutional decision in Guinn v. Nevada 
State Legislature,15 and the first justice in the majority to run for reelection after Guinn 
was issued16—was ousted by an arguably much less qualified opponent17 who, with the 
help of several wealthy special interest groups and the press,18 grossly, carelessly, and 
“shameless[ly]”19 distorted the facts of Guinn to the voting public.20  Considering this 
                                                 
10 See Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., Preserving Judicial Independence—An Exegesis, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 835, 
844 (2002) (“By far the most troubling threats to judicial independence are those associated with judicial 
elections.”).  My call for the Nevada Legislature to amend Article VI should come as no surprise to those 
familiar with this area of legal literature.  See Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the 
Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. 
REV. 759, 760 n.296 (1995) (noting that “calls for new methods of judicial selection frequently come after 
elections or other events that diminish the standing of the courts”).  Although numerous commentators have 
called for reform after an unseemly judicial election, this is the first judicial election, and the first law 
journal article for that matter, which revolves around an incumbent being ousted on the basis of a civil 
decision. 
11 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(c)(2), Comment (2004) (“Merit selection of judges is 
a preferable manner in which to select the judiciary.”); AM. BAR ASS’N, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: 
REPORT ON THE ABA COMMISSION OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 96 (1997) 
(“The American Bar Association strongly endorses the merit selection of judges, as opposed to their 
election . . . . Five times between August 1972 and August 1984 the House of Delegates has approved 
recommendations stating the preference for merit selection and encouraging bar associations in 
jurisdictions where judges are elected . . . to work for the adoption of merit selection and retention”). 
12 See, e.g., White, 536 U.S. at 788 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I join the opinion of the Court but write 
separately to express my concerns about judicial elections generally . . . the very practice of electing judges 
undermines this interest [a State’s interest in an impartial judiciary].”). 
13 See, e.g., generally, Julian N. Eule, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: State Courts, Voter Initiatives and the 
Threat of Electoral Reprisal, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 733 (1994). 
14 The sea of legal literature calling for the abandonment of judicial elections is overwhelming.  Indeed, one 
commentator, in noting the seemingly endless amount of academic work on the subject, concluded that the 
issue has been addressed “ad nauseam.”  Alex B. Long, “Stop Me Before I Vote for This Judge Again”: 
Judicial Conduct Organizations, Judicial Accountability, and the Disciplining of Elected Judges, 106 W. 
VA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2003).  In light of Justice Brennan’s admonition to “jealously guard” judicial 
independence, commentators and courts should continuously track the status of judicial independence and 
welcome new commentary that seeks to protect this time-honored ideal.  This article does just that and is 
the first article to address a judicial election in which a sitting incumbent was ousted in a judicial election 
because of a single, unpopular civil decision.  See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 409 (1989). 
15 71 P.3d 1269 (Nev. 2003), overruled in part by Nevadans for Nev. v. Beers, 142 P.3d 339 (Nev. 2006). 
16 Although Justice Becker was the only Justice in the Guinn majority to run for reelection, prior to the Seat 
G race, Justice Deborah A. Agosti, the author of Guinn opinion, resigned from the high court after the 
attacks launched on her and the Nevada Supreme Court after Guinn was handed down.  See Agosti, supra 
note 9.  Additionally, Justice Bob Rose, who also concurred in the Guinn opinion, retired from the high 
court instead of running for reelection.  Although Justice Rose retired, it seems clear that in light of Justice 
Becker’s fate, both Justice Agosti and Rose would have suffered the same ending. 
17 See infra notes 157-167, 175-176, and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 177-183 and accompanying text. 
19 See Jon Ralston, Jon Ralston on this Election Season’s Top 10 Performances, LAS VEGAS SUN, Nov. 1, 
2006, at A5 (“[H]ere are the Top 10 nominees for Most Shameless Performance of Campaign ’06 . . . . You 
raised our taxes, Justice Becker: Except she didn’t.  Judge Nancy Saitta ran an ad accusing Justice Nancy 
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unprecedented result, one might rightly feel perplexed, perhaps agitated, with the 
realization of liberty jeopardized. 
¶3 Although the books are full of examples in which an incumbent judge has been 
voted out of office in a judicial election and replaced by a less qualified opponent who 
distorted the holding of one politically unpopular decision to the voting public, those 
elections dealt exclusively with an unpopular criminal decision.21  The Seat G race, 
however, breaks new ground, as Justice Becker lost her seat on the Nevada Supreme 
Court not because of a single unpopular criminal decision, but because of a single 
unpopular civil tax opinion.22 
¶4 To Nevada and America’s dismay, Seat G illustrates that the problems with judicial 
elections—once confined to criminal decisions—have now crept into the civil realm of 
dispute resolution.  It further illustrates that judges who seek retention must now not only 
worry about their jobs when making a politically unpopular criminal decision, but also 
fear reprisal for making a politically unpopular, yet legally justifiable, decision in a civil 
matter.23  Noting this perilous movement, all states should abandon judicial elections in 
all forms, lest the courts become “obligated to do the will of the people, to act like 
legislators in surveying the public’s desire and then representing it in its decision making, 
rather than dispassionately interpreting the law, and weighing and balancing conflicts in 
the law.”24 
                                                                                                                                                 
Becker of signing onto a decision—the infamous Guinn v. Legislature—that caused the ‘biggest tax 
increase’ in the state annals.  But it didn’t.  The Legislature passed the 2003 increase with two-thirds of 
each house.”). 
20 See Agosti, supra note 9, at 881 (“The public’s reaction to the decision was being shaped without having 
the benefit of hearing anything other than one extreme view of the decision.  Even those papers that favored 
the decision did so without such an accurate explanation of the decision as would reassure the citizens of 
Nevada.  The public was told that the court had disregarded the will of the people, had ignored and ‘thrown 
out’ a constitutional mandate the voters had placed in the constitution, and had violated principles of law to 
get to its result.  Of course, none of these accusations were true.”); see also Sean Whaley, State Supreme 
Court: Incumbent Justices Lead Opponents But Vast Numbers of Voters Undecided, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., 
Sept. 27, 2006, at 3B, available at http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2006/Sep-27-Wed-
2006/news/9891060.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2008) (“Becker is the subject of negative ads about the 
decision, which suggests she is responsible for the $833 million dollar tax increase approved by the 
Legislature.  The ads are paid for by a group called Nevadans Against Judicial Activism.”). 
21 See infra notes 110-120 and accompanying text; see also e.g., Bright & Keenan, supra note 10. 
22 See infra notes 136-167 and accompanying text. 
23 One commentator has noted that, in discussing the California Supreme Court election debacle of 1986 in 
which three Supreme Court justices were ousted due to a single unpopular criminal decision, the reelection 
prospects of these three justices were also hurt because of because of several civil opinions that the court 
had issued that were unfavorable to the powerful banking community of California.  The commentator, 
however, explicitly noted that it was the death penalty opinion which ultimately did the Justices in (or, I 
guess one could say, out).  See Stephen R. Barnett, California Justice, 78 CAL. L. REV. 247, 255 (1990) 
(reviewing JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 
(1989)).  Additionally, some commentators have speculated that Justice David Lanphier of the Nebraska 
Supreme Court may have been defeated in 1996 after he had authored a unanimous opinion invalidating a 
term-limits amendment to the state constitution.  See Jonathan L. Entin, Judicial Selection and Political 
Culture, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 523, 523-24 (2001).  However, Justice Lanphier was likely ousted because of 
several rulings that overturned second-degree murder convictions.  See Traciel V. Reid, The Politicization 
of Retention Elections: Lessons from the Defeat of Justices Lanphier and White, 83 JUDICATURE 68, 70-71 
(1999). 
24 See Agosti, supra note 9, at 881.  Agosti’s article emphasizes the movement of the problems of judicial 
elections into the civil realm to demonstrate the fact that the problems of judicial elections now threaten all 
aspects of our law. 
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¶5 In the wake of Seat G—an election that will likely go down as one of the more 
embarrassing and judicially debasing state supreme court elections in our nation’s 
history25—it was only apropos that several Nevada Senators proposed Senate Joint 
Resolution No. 2 (SJR2),26 seeking to amend Article VI of the Nevada Constitution.  
SJR2, which the Nevada legislature recently enacted,27 proposed that Nevada eliminate 
judicial elections and adopt the “Missouri plan,”28 which is a merit-based appointment 
method by which Nevada District Court Judges and Nevada Supreme Court Justices are 
chosen by a nominating commission, appointed by the Governor, and later subject to a 
retention vote.29 
¶6 Despite this amendment, SJR2 is still insufficient to bolster judicial autonomy and 
eliminate the problems Nevada has experienced with judicial elections.  As such, this 
article urges the Nevada legislature to promulgate legislation to amend various portions 
of Article VI.  Specifically, this article argues that the Nevada legislature should amend 
Article VI, Section 22 of the Nevada Constitution by adding a provision providing for 
Senate approval of nominees and setting the term of their judgeship at twelve years.  This 
article also pleads with all states that retain judicial elections, in any form, to promulgate 
legislation that would completely eliminate judicial elections in all forms.  For, as the 
Seat G election illustrates, judicial elections are a “disgraceful”30 “scourge”31 for a variety 
of reasons.  The people of Nevada and America deserve better than judicial elections; 
                                                 
25 Numerous Nevada media moguls have openly expressed their embarrassment with Nevada’s judicial 
elections.  See e.g., Jon Ralston, Jon Ralston on the Embarrassing State of Nevada’s Judicial System, LAS 
VEGAS SUN, June 9, 2006, at A4.  Ralston’s sentiments reflect not only those of Nevadans, but also of those 
Americans who are familiar with Nevada’s judicial elections.  Cf. Linda P. Campbell, Sitting Ducks on the 
Bench, DALLAS FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Nov. 10, 2006, at B1.  In this Dallas Fort Worth 
newspaper article, recently retired United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor notes that, 
out of all the decisions she authored or in which she concurred while a sitting Justice, she wishes that she 
could change her vote in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White because of the embarrassing and 
undesirable state court elections that have taken place after White was handed down.  Campbell’s article, to 
no surprise, specifically references the Nevada Seat G race and cites some of the embarrassing and 
judicially debasing tactics used by the candidates during the election. 
26 S.J. Res. 2, 74th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2007). 
27 See Nevada Legislature Bill History of SJR2, http://www.leg.state.nv.us/74th/Reports/history.cfm? 
DocumentType=8&BillNo=2.  SJR2, which originated in the Senate, passed with a fifteen to six vote in 
that house.  Afterwards, SJR2 went to the Assembly, where it passed thirty to eleven (with one excused).  
On May 31, 2007, SJR2 was enrolled and delivered to the Secretary of State. 
28 Missouri was the first State to adopt this method of appointment, thus the name “Missouri plan.”  See 
LARRY C. BERKSON, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A SPECIAL REPORT 1, 4-5 (Am. 
Judicature Society 2004) (1980).  Although the Missouri plan tries to inject more judicial independence 
into the method of placing judges on the bench, this method of appointment is not without its own set of 
problems.  Indeed, as will be discussed more fully in Section III, infra, this article concludes that the 
retention portion of the Missouri plan is just as dangerous to judicial independence as popular judicial 
elections.  As Professor Charles Gardner Geyh observed: 
[H]orror stories emerging from partisan judicial elections in Texas have led to calls for non-
partisan judicial elections, which can be countered with horror stories from non-partisan 
elections in Wisconsin, Ohio and Michigan, which in turn have served as fodder for merit 
selection proponents to load their cannons, only to have them backfire in the face of retention 
election disasters in Tennessee and Nebraska.  All of the foregoing examples are illustrative of 
the perils to impartial justice inherent in selecting or retaining judges by popular vote. 
Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 74 (2003). 
29 See Nev. S. Res. 2. 
30 See TAFT, supra note 2, at 418. 
31 See Fordham & Husted, Jr., supra note 2, at 61. 
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indeed, as Justice Jackson once stated: “One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to free 
speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may 
not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.”32 
¶7 The undesirable realities of judicial elections and the recent spread of their ills into 
the civil realm of dispute resolution render this method of placing judges on the bench 
more dangerous than ever, particularly on the state supreme court level.33  Noting this 
reality, it is fortunate that certain politically unpopular decisions—Brown v. Board of 
Education34 and Engel v. Vitale,35 for example—were brought, and decided, in federal 
court, a forum in which highly talented and solicitous judges are given protection from 
public retaliation for socially unpopular, yet legally justifiable, decisions. 
¶8 Section Two of this article begins by defining the term “judicial independence” as 
it is used in this article, and then examines the various historical and contemporary views 
regarding the importance of judicial independence to the preservation of liberty, 
individual rights, and respect for the bench.  Section Three looks at judicial elections in 
general, and the Seat G election in particular, and demonstrates how these elections 
impinge on judicial independence and individual liberties and corrode public respect for 
the judiciary.  This section also examines SJR2 and demonstrates how these amendments 
fail to eliminate the ills associated with judicial elections.  Finally, this section discusses 
how the Nevada legislature should amend Article VI, Section 22 of the Nevada 
Constitution to eliminate these problems.  In the Conclusion, this article urges the Nevada 
legislature to amend Section 22 (which was amended by SJR2) in the next legislative 
session, with the modifications outlined in this article, and pleads with all other states that 
still retain judicial elections to follow in Nevada’s footsteps.  By completely eliminating 
judicial elections, states will be, in the words of the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist, 
bolstering “one of the crown jewels of our system of government today.”36 
II. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
¶9 Before discussing historical and contemporary views regarding the significance of 
judicial independence, it is imperative to first understand what judicial independence is, 
and from whom, or of what, the judiciary is seeking to be independent.  The founders 
sought to establish judicial independence in two senses, which are interrelated.37  First, 
the founders wanted to make the judiciary literally independent of the two other branches 
of government.38  In other words, the framers sought to create a separate and distinct 
judicial branch of government that was autonomous from the legislative and executive 
                                                 
32 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
33 One commentator has noted that federal habeas corpus review has been significantly diminished in recent 
years because of the increasing trust that the Supreme Court of the United States has placed in state 
supreme courts.  See Bright & Keenan, supra note 10, at 768-69.  Noting this fact, it is clear why it is 
important to have judges who are not beholden to public vicissitudes. 
34 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segregation of children in public schools on 
the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
35 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding that required participation in official daily classroom 
prayer violated the Establishment Clause). 
36 Federal Judges Association, http://www.federaljudgesassoc.org/scholars (last visited Jan. 22, 2008). 
37 Id. (“The Federal Constitution is structured so as to foster . . . independence in two ways: first, by making 
the Judiciary separate from the other two branches of government; and, second, by guaranteeing to Article 
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branches.  Second, the founders sought to provide the judiciary with independence in 
their decision making by protecting the judiciary from improper outside influences and 
from reprisal from the other two branches for unpopular opinions.39  This was done, as 
will be discussed more fully below, through the prophylactic protections of life tenure 
and fixed salary in Article III of the Constitution.  It is this second sense of judicial 
independence with which this article is concerned. 
¶10 When this article speaks of judicial independence in decision making, it does not 
intend to “connote the image of some isolated jurist in the desert completely separated 
from reality, including being separated from the legislature and the executive, or immune 
from constraints or criticism.”40  Rather, when this article speaks of judicial 
independence, it is speaking of “a general principle of the highest importance to the 
proper administration of justice,”41 and the need for “a judicial officer, in exercising 
judicial authority . . . [to] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension 
of personal consequences to himself.”42  In other words, when this article speaks of 
judicial independence, it speaks of a position in which a judge, as the interpreter of the 
law, will not feel compelled to consider improper factors, to wit, anything other than the 
facts and the applicable principles of law. 
¶11 The Federal Judges Association (FJA), in discussing judicial independence, 
provides an excellent explanation of the concept: “What do we mean by judicial 
independence?  We mean, in simple terms, an environment in which ‘Article III Judges’ 
(that is, federal judges appointed pursuant to Article III of the Federal Constitution) are 
able to render principled and unbiased court decisions based solely on the ‘rule of law,’ 
that is, what the law says.”43  Professor Archibald Cox, in further defining and 
articulating what is meant by judicial independence, also stated: 
The idea of judicial independence implies: (1) that judges shall decide 
lawsuits free from any outside pressure: personal, economic, or political, 
including any fear of reprisal; (2) that the courts’ decisions shall be final in 
all cases except as changed by general, prospective legislation, and final 
upon constitutional questions except as changed by constitutional 
amendment; and (3) that there shall be no tampering with the organization 
or jurisdiction of the courts for the purposes of controlling their decisions 
upon constitutional questions.44
¶12 Judicial independence thus implies “two reciprocal obligations.”45  First, judges 
must cut ties from “loyalties or implied commitment” to individuals or entities, and 
second, judges must foot decisions “‘according to law,’ according to a continuity of 
reasoned principle found in the words of the Constitution, statute, or other controlling 
                                                 
39 Id. 
40 Michael Traynor, Judicial Independence: A Cornerstone of Liberty, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 487, 
493 (2007). 
41 Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871). 
42 Id. 
43 See Federal Judges Association, supra note 36. 
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instrument, in the implications of its structure and apparent purposes, and in prior judicial 
precedents, traditional understanding, and like sources of law.”46  Those judges who have 
not cut ties, or are beholden to outside groups or influenced by politics or who fear 
reprisal for unpopular decisions are “putting the independence of the courts at risk.”47  As 
Justice Kennedy observed, the law “makes a promise—neutrality.”48  Judges who are 
beholden to special interests or parties, even ostensibly, fail this great guarantee. 
¶13 Turning now to our forefathers, after their painful experiences with the English 
monarchy, they came to understand the importance of, and need for, an independent 
judiciary.  Indeed, the founders considered judicial autonomy so important, so vital, so 
essential, that it was one of the express reasons they declared independence from 
England.49  For in England, judges were appointed by the King and served at his 
pleasure;50 judges’ salaries and the length of their tenure were dependent on the King,51 
and judges were often, if not always, removed from the bench by the King when he 
disagreed with a judicial decision.52  From time to time, the King would not only dispense 
with judges’ jobs when he was unhappy with their performance, decisions or views, but 
also would dispose of judges’ lives.53  As Thomas Paine aptly observed, in England, the 
King was the law.54 
                                                 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 See STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSION ON PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS 1 (Feb. 2002) (quoting Justice Anthony 
Kennedy in a speech to an ABA symposium on judicial independence), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/judind/pdf/commissionreport4-03.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2008). 
49 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776).  In breaking from England, the founders 
listed as one of their grievances the fact that the King had made “[j]udges dependent on his Will alone for 
the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.” 
50 See Grodin, supra note 9, at 1970.  In England, prior to the time when the King appointed judges, the 
judicial function was intertwined with the Curia Regis, or the King’s Court.  Indeed, the King and a group 
of advisors (whom he selected) adjudicated all royal legal matters.  It was not until after the death of 
William the Conqueror that a separate judiciary came into existence.  See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND 
REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 346-47 (1983). 
51 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 49, para. 3; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, at 
512 (Alexander Hamilton) (E. Earle ed., 1973) (“Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute 
more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support . . . [for] power over a 
man’s subsistence amounts to a power over his will.”); cf. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 164, 179 (1994) 
(“A fixed term of office . . . is a means of promoting judicial independence, which in turn helps to ensure 
judicial impartiality.”). 
52 See Frank J. Battisti, An Independent Judiciary or an Evanescent Dream, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 711, 
712 n.2 (1975) (noting that the Stuart monarchs often removed judges who issued opinions that were 
unfavorable to the Crown).  Consider, as an example of the King’s control over the judiciary, when Chief 
Edward Coke opposed the King’s claim that the King could sit in lieu of an English judge in a case.  Not 
only did Coke’s objections fail, but also King James I nearly imprisoned Coke and promised to confine 
Coke to the Tower of London if Coke dared challenge the King’s authority again.  See Burkeley N. Riggs 
& Tamera D. Westerberg, Judicial Independence: An Historical Perspective, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 337, 337 
n.3 (1997). 
53 See JACK M. SOSIN, THE ARISTOCRACY OF THE LONG ROBE: THE ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN 
AMERICA 32 (1989) (discussing the hanging of the chief justice of the King’s Bench in the 14th century). 
54 See THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 57 (Penguin Books 1987) (1776) (“Let a day be solemnly set apart 
for proclaiming the Charter; let it be brought forth placed on the Divine Law, the Word of God; let a crown 
be placed thereon, by which the World may know, that so far as we approve of monarchy, that in America 
the law is king. For as in absolute governments the King is Law, so in free Countries the law ought to be 
king; and there ought to be no other.”). 
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¶14 The King’s control of the judiciary extended beyond England and into colonial 
America.  To be sure, when the King’s dominion of the English judiciary was eliminated 
by the 1701 Act of Settlement, King George III continued to exercise power over the 
judiciary in colonial America.55  Indeed, King George III frequently invoked his power 
over the colonial courts, repeatedly appointing and removing judges from the colonial 
bench, probably to demonstrate to the colonialists that it was the King, not the judge, who 
declared what the law was.56 
¶15 Given this tyrannical behavior by the King, the colonialists knew that in order for 
America to be a land of liberty and justice, it would need to have a judiciary free from the 
control of a King or representative body.57  They knew that judges needed to be 
sufficiently independent from the King so that they could adjudicate legal disputes 
without outside pressure or influence.58  Accordingly, the colonialists, through Article III, 
created a judiciary where—much like the judiciary in England after the 1701 Act of 
Settlement—federal judges were afforded life tenure and a fixed salary during good 
behavior, which could not be diminished while they were in office.59 
¶16 The protections of Article III were explicitly fashioned to combat the undesirable 
consequences—which the founders had experienced firsthand60—associated with a 
judiciary who was beholden to the representative body.  These safeguards were grounded 
on the idea that “[i]n the general course of human nature, a power over a man’s 
subsistence amounts to a power over his will.”61 
¶17 In drafting the structure of Article III, the revolutionaries not only drew heavily 
upon their experience with the monarchy in both England and colonial America, they also 
drew heavily upon the great legal minds of Blackstone and Montesquieu.62  Consider, for 
                                                 
55 See Joseph J. Darby, Guarantees and Limits of the Independence and Impartiality of the Judge, 41 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 997, 998 (2004) (“It should be noted that the Act of Settlement of 1701 did not apply to the 
English colonies in North America.  Colonial judges were regarded by most American colonists as 
subservient agents of the King.”). 
56 Cf. L. Anthony Sutin, Check, Please: Constitutional Dimensions of Halting the Pay of Public Officials, 
26 J. LEGIS. 221, 257 (2000) (noting that the King continued to control Colonial judges after the 1701 Act 
of Settlement). 
57 The idea of judicial independence is deeply rooted in the history of English law.  Consider, for example, 
Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (1610), in which Lord Coke held that, in a false imprisonment case 
brought by a student against the Board of Censors of the Royal College of Physicians, the Board could not 
adjudicate the case against itself because of the interest which the Board had in the outcome of the case.  
This view—nemo judex in re sua—or “no man is to be a judge in his own case,” was, undoubtedly, 
influential in the founders’ belief that judicial independence was vital to a properly functioning court 
system.  See Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of 
Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 480 (1986).  The roots of judicial independence, however, can 
be traced to around 350 B.C. and Aristotle and his three elements of government: general assembly, public 
officials, and the judiciary.  See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 165-77 (Ernest Barker trans., R.F. Stalley rev. 
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1995) (c. 335-322 B.C.E.). 
58 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776). 
59 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
60 See Michael L. Buenger, Of Money and Judicial Independence: Can Inherent Powers Protect State 
Courts in Tough Fiscal Times?, 92 KY. L.J. 979, 997 n.56 (2003-04) (“It has been suggested that the 
Founders’ conceptual commitment to judicial independence was a reaction to prior experiences under 
colonial rule, rather than an outgrowth of a culture that promoted judicial independence as a core governing 
principle.”). 
61
 THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, supra note 51, at 513. 
62 See, e.g., Natalie Wexler, In the Beginning: The First Three Chief Justices, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1373, 
1377 n.16 (2006); Graham O’Donoghue, Precatory Executive Statements and Permissible Judicial 
Responses in the Context of Holocaust-Claims Litigation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1155 n.192 (2006). 
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example, the views of Alexander Hamilton—a brilliant Federalist and a significant force 
in establishing the protections afforded the judiciary in Article III—regarding judicial 
independence.  Hamilton, drawing and building upon Blackstone63 and Montesquieu,64 in 
Federalist Paper No. 78 eloquently examined and discussed the importance of judicial 
independence.  He believed that judicial independence was “one of the most valuable of 
the modern improvements in the practice of government . . . an excellent barrier to the 
encroachments and oppressions of the representative body.”65  Indeed, Hamilton strongly 
believed that “‘there is no liberty, if not the power of the judging be not separated from 
the legislative and executive powers.’ . . . The complete independence of the courts of 
justice is . . . essential . . . .”66  Like Blackstone and Montesquieu, Hamilton believed that 
judicial independence was essential to the preservation of judicial autonomy and, in turn, 
the preservation of individual rights, liberty, and the neutral interpretation and application 
of the Constitution.67  He was convinced that liberty “can have nothing to fear from the 
judiciary alone, but would have everything to fear from its union with either of the other 
departments,”68 and he strongly supposed that judicial independence was 
“indispensable”69 to the preservation of the law and individual liberty. 
¶18 Blackstone, Montesquieu, and Hamilton’s insights and observations regarding 
judicial independence have been fortified by years of American experience.  Without a 
doubt, Article III’s endowments of life tenure and fixed salary have bolstered courts’ 
autonomy, which in turn has secured the liberties of all Americans and furthered the 
public’s respect and faith in the judicial branch.  Federal courts, throughout their 
existence, have rejoiced in the independence afforded the judiciary through Article III, 
and have expressly decried outside influences which may weaken these protections or 
otherwise undermine the autonomy of the court at any time.70  The late Chief Justice 
                                                 
63 With regard to judicial independence, Blackstone stated: 
In this distinct and separate existence of the judicial power, in a peculiar body of men, 
nominated indeed, but not removable at pleasure, by the crown, consists one main preservative 
of the public liberty; which cannot subsist long in any state, unless the administration of 
common justice be in some degree separated both from the legislative and also from the 
executive power.  Were it joined with the legislature, the life, liberty, and property, of the subject 
would be in the hands of arbitrary judges, whose decisions would be then regulated only by their 
own opinions, and not by any fundamental principles of law; which, though legislators may 
depart from, yet judges are bound to observe. 
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *259-60 (1765), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/ 
founders/documents/v1ch10s6.html. 
64 See CHARLES DE SECONDAT BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, bk. 11, ch. 6, at 157 
(Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748) (“Nor is there liberty if the 
power of judging is not separate from legislative power and from executive power . . . . If it were joined to 
executive power, the judge could have the force of an oppressor.”). 





70 See generally Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring); 
see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 409 (1989); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe 
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60 (1982); Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 861 (1998) 
(noting that courts have an ongoing duty “to take steps necessary to maintain public confidence in the 
impartiality of the judiciary”); Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972) (noting that parties 
are entitled to have impartial and detached courts decide merits of case); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 
(1927) (finding a due process violation where a party’s liberty or property is subjected “to the judgment of 
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William Rehnquist, in discussing the importance and benefits of judicial autonomy, 
stated that the “independence of [the judiciary] . . . is every bit as important in securing 
the recognition of the rights granted by the Constitution as is the declaration of those 
rights themselves.”71  Former Justice Penny White of the Tennessee Supreme Court—an 
individual all too familiar with the value of judicial independence—aptly noted: 
[H]istorical and academic statements about judicial independence may be 
somewhat helpful in our effort to assess its significance to our system of 
justice, [but] these examples are not nearly as helpful as practical ones.  
When thinking about judicial independence, what it is and how essential it 
may be, it is perhaps more helpful to think about where we would be 
without it.  Our courts would be quite different had judicial independence 
not been a foundation of our legal system.  As we have noted, no 
legislative acts would be subject to judicial review because Chief Justice 
Marshall would have minded the Jefferson administration, which 
characterized Marbury v. Madison as “a brazen attempt to induce the 
Supreme Court to interfere unlawfully with the conduct of the Executive 
Branch of the Government.”  Poll taxes, literacy tests, loyalty oaths, 
political gerrymandering, segregated public accommodations, and 
lynchings would all have survived because the judiciary would have been 
powerless to question, let alone invalidate, the actions of the legislative or 
executive branches.72
Numerous other judges73 and scholars74 have echoed the sentiments of Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Penny White. 
¶19 Having defined judicial independence and identified how that term is used in this 
article, this section looks at the difficult duties of today’s judges and demonstrates how 
these duties are made even more complex and intricate because of the harsh political 
landscape in which judges operate today.  By understanding the difficult duties of a judge 
and the thorny political climate in which he or she now operates, the reader will better 
understand why states should now, more than ever, do everything in their power to 
eliminate judicial elections and bolster the independence of their court systems. 
¶20 The duties of a judge are complex; the responsibility of interpreting and declaring 
what the “law is”75 is no easy task.  United States District Court Judge Bruce S. Jenkins, 
                                                                                                                                                 
a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion 
against him in his case”). 
71 William H. Rehnquist, An Independent Judiciary: Bulwark of the Constitution, 9 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 8 
(1988). 
72 Penny White, It’s a Wonderful Life, or Is It? America Without Judicial Independence, 27 U. MEM. L. 
REV. 1, 5 (1996) (internal citations omitted). 
73 See Bobby R. Baldock et al., A Discussion of Judicial Independence with Judges of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 355, 356 (1997) (noting Judge Baldock’s 
belief that the judiciary’s “independence com[es] largely from the constitutional provisions regarding life 
tenure and guaranteed compensation”); Judge Thomas I. Vanaskie, The Independence and Responsibility of 
the Federal Judiciary, 46 VILL. L. REV. 745, 759-60 (2001) (discussing the value of judicial independence). 
74 See generally Scott D. Wiener, Note, Popular Justice: State Judicial Elections and Procedural Due 
Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 187 (1996). 
75 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-78 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.  Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity 
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in discussing the role and duty of a judge, has stated: “No judge seeks business.  He takes 
what comes, and within the tradition of service and the boundaries of power and 
competency does the best he can to deal with questions put to him by others.  Many a 
question is asked that a judge would prefer not to answer, but a judge is duty bound to 
answer as best he can.”76 
¶21 One of the many jobs of a judge, indeed, one of the many duties of a judge, is to 
answer difficult legal questions.  This duty becomes even thornier when the question 
involves an unpopular group or a criminal defendant.77  Judges must, among other things, 
protect the Constitutional rights of all—underrepresented individuals, unpopular groups, 
and criminals included.  Indeed, the Bill of Rights, which judges are duty bound to 
uphold and protect, was created for the “very purpose . . . [of] withdraw[ing] certain 
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, [and] to place them beyond the 
reach of the majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied 
by the courts.”78  Not only are judges often required to make unpopular decisions 
upholding the rights or privileges of unpopular groups or criminal defendants, judges 
must, pursuant to their duty as interpreters of the law and checks on legislative and 
executive power, invalidate acts of Congress, the executive, or other lawmakers.79 
¶22 Often when judges protect the rights of unpopular groups or invalidate acts of the 
legislature or executive, the public is enraged.  As the FJA has stated: “Inevitably from 
time to time the protection of individual rights requires unpopular decisions that invoke 
adverse reactions from the public, its legislative representatives, or the executive 
branch.”80 
¶23 In addition to the complex and socially unpopular legal questions that judges must 
answer, the difficulty of a judge’s duty is further compounded by the harsh political 
landscape in which judges now operate.  Today, judges face unparalleled attacks from a 
variety of political and special interest groups for their legal decisions.  Consider, for 
example, some of the comments made by various newspapers across America in recent 
times, wherein judges have been dubbed as “idiots,” “fuzzy headed buffoons,” “stooges,” 
“arrogantly authoritarian,” “a band of outlaws,” “felonious five,” “transparent shills for 
the right wing of the Republican Party,” and “‘judicial sociopaths’ who ‘belong behind 
bars’ for their ‘treasonous behavior.’”81  Consider also the attacks which are being 
exerted on the courts by the other two branches of government.  Tom DeLay, once House 
majority leader from Texas, stated that “[j]udges need to be intimidated.”82  Former 
                                                                                                                                                 
expound and interpret that rule.”). 
76 Bruce S. Jenkins, The Integrity of Words, 1988 UTAH L. REV. 291, 292 (1988). 
77 See Susan N. Herman, Commentary, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 339, 339 (1997) (“Article III suggests that 
federal judges are expected to take the part of minorities, dissenters, and other politically powerless and 
unpopular people, including criminal defendants.”); see also Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth 
Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 475, 527-28 (2005). 
78 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
79 See Barnett, supra note 23, at 257. 
80 Federal Judges Association, http://www.federaljudgesassoc.org (last visited Jan. 22, 2008). 
81 Geyh, supra note 28, at 45; see also Cox, supra note 44, at 574-75 (“‘Bashing judges’ has become a long 
and distinguished tradition, as we are often reminded by quotations from Thomas Jefferson, Abraham 
Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt.”) (internal citations omitted).  Such comments, as Judge Jenkins has 
noted, often tell us much more about the speaker.  See Bruce S. Jenkins, Is That a Fact? Evidence and the 
Trial Lawyer, 12 UTAH BAR J. 19, 23 (1999). 
82 Joan Biskupic, Hill Republicans Target “Judicial Activism” Conservatives Block Nominees, Threaten 
Impeachment and Term Limits, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1997, at A1. 
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Governor Gray Davis of California, when asked what should happen to a judge who 
issues an opinion contrary to his own, stated that such an individual “shouldn’t be a 
judge.  They should resign.  My appointees should reflect my views.  They are not there 
to be independent agents.”83  Tennessee Governor Don Sundquist, after a Tennessee 
Supreme Court Justice was voted out of her seat on the basis of a single death penalty 
decision that he opposed and helped distort to the voting public, remarked: “Should a 
judge look over his shoulder to the next election in determining how to rule on a case?  I 
hope so.  I hope so.”84 
¶24 Although judge-bashing has a long and distinguished history,85 the practice has, 
according to many within the legal profession, reached unprecedented heights.86  To be 
sure, numerous jurists have concluded that today’s courts face unrivaled amounts of 
inappropriate disparagement.87  Justice O’Connor, for example, has stated that “the 
breadth and intensity of rage currently being leveled at the judiciary may be unmatched in 
American history.”88  United States District Court Judge Paul Friedman, in light of the 
attacks being launched on the courts, concluded: “It is hard to remember a time when 
judges, courts, and the judicial branch in general were subjected to so much gratuitous 
criticism, vitriolic commentary, and purposely misleading attacks. . . . if this current, 
often politically motivated drumbeat against judges continues unchallenged, more and 
more people . . . will lose faith not just in the courts but in the rule of law itself.”89 
¶25 Noting this harsh political landscape in which today’s judges operate, it is 
imperative that we afford judges—judges who are called upon to protect the rights and 
liberties of all and declare what the “law is”90 in the face of harsh criticism, public 
outrage or misunderstanding—sufficient protection and independence to exercise wisdom 
and courage in their legal decision making.  Do we really want judges to feel intimidated, 
to look over their shoulders, or to simply be mannequins in the hands of a governor in 
deciding legal questions?  Do we really want judges—who have been called idiots, 
buffoons, bandits, or stooges—to feel that they must issue decisions that will avoid such 
public descriptions and preserve their jobs?  In answering this question, one need only 
consider where we would be as a society if the Justices in Brown v. Board of Education91 
reflected the views of popular politics or paused to look over their shoulders before 
rendering this monumental decision. 
¶26 Our founders sought to afford every individual who had his or her day in an 
American court a thoughtful, neutral, evenhanded, and unbiased judge who would follow 
the applicable principles of law when ruling on a case.  Individual liberties, as well as 
continued public respect for the court, depend upon this independence.  In the spirit of 
this noble and worthy aspiration, all states should strive to protect and further the 
                                                 
83 Transcript of Governor’s Comments on Judges, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 29, 2000, at 8. 
84 Penny J. White et al., Breaking the Most Vulnerable Branch: Do Rising Threats to Judicial Independence 
Preclude Due Process in Capital Cases? 31 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 123, 140 (1999). 
85 See Sandra Day O’Connor, The Threat to Judicial Independence, THE BENCHER 10 (Jan./Feb. 2007); see 
also Campbell, supra note 25, at B1. 
86 See O’Connor, supra note 85, at 10. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 See Traynor, supra note 40, at 496-97. 
90 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-78 (1803). 
91 347 U.S. 483, 483 (1954). 
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autonomy of the judiciary.  For our forefathers, freeing judges from the control of the 
King and affording them life tenure and a fixed salary was essential to achieving judicial 
independence.  In the next section, this article discusses why, in our day and time, states 
must eliminate judicial elections to protect the independence of the court. 
III. JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, SEAT G, AND SJR2 
¶27 Having discussed what judicial independence is, the various historical and 
contemporary views regarding the importance of judicial independence to individual 
liberties and public respect for the court, as well as the harsh political environment in 
which judges now operate, this article now looks at how judicial elections, as currently 
used by various states, threaten the independence of the judiciary.  Further, this section 
illustrates why, in the spirit of our forefathers’ aspiration for an independent judiciary, all 
states should abandon judicial elections. 
¶28 The section begins by examining the views of our founders and the original thirteen 
states regarding judicial elections, and discusses why our forefathers believed judicial 
elections were dangerous.  This section then looks at when and why the practice of 
judicial elections began in the states and examines the negative consequences these 
elections have had upon the independence of the judiciary.  As an example of the 
impropriety of judicial elections, this section looks at two recent judicial elections in 
Texas and Tennessee, and then reviews the subsequent United States Supreme Court 
decision in White v. Republican Party of Minnesota,92 wherein Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence explicitly condemned the use of judicial elections.  This section then turns to 
the Seat G race—a race that has broken new ground and illustrates all of the problems 
inherent in judicial elections—and discusses how this race has drastically broadened the 
dangers of judicial elections.  After discussing the impropriety of the Seat G race, this 
section then examines SJR2—which was recently enacted by the Nevada legislature—
and argues that Article VI, Section 22 of the Nevada Constitution should be amended in 
the next legislative session to completely eliminate judicial elections in Nevada. 
¶29 Not only did Hamilton and the federalists believe that life tenure and a fixed salary 
for judges was vital to securing the independence of the court,93 they also believed that 
judicial elections were precarious and a serious threat to the autonomy of the judiciary.94  
Indeed, Hamilton believed that judicial elections, much like the ability of the King to 
control a judge’s tenure and pay, threatened the very foundation of America’s proposed 
legal system.95  Even the anti-federalists, who were extremely suspicious of the power of 
the courts to conduct judicial review and who desired to have judicial decisions subject to 
the review of the legislature, believed that judicial elections were dangerous.96 
¶30 The original thirteen states shared the views of federalists, anti-federalists, and 
authors of the Constitution regarding the impropriety of judicial elections, as evidenced 
                                                 
92 536 U.S. 765, 789 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
93 See THE ANTIFEDERALIST NO. 78, at 224-25 (“Brutus”) (Morton Borden ed., 1965) (“It would be 
improper that the judicial [branch] should be elective, because their business requires . . . that they may 
maintain firmness and steadiness in their decisions.”). 
94 See Stephen Shapiro, The Judiciary in the United States: A Search for Fairness, Independence, and 
Competence, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 667, 671 (2001). 
95 See Judith L. Maute, Selecting Justice in State Courts: The Ballot Box or the Backroom?, 41 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 1197, 1201 (2000). 
96 Id. 
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by the fact that all thirteen states, just like the federal government, originally appointed, 
not elected, judges to the bench.97  Indeed, it was not until the early nineteenth century 
that judicial elections were introduced among the states as a form of appointing judges to 
the bench.98  Prior to this time, judicial elections were, in the words of one commentator, 
“unheard of.”99 
¶31 Judicial elections began in the states in the early 1830s during Andrew Jackson’s 
presidency and his pursuit of Jeffersonian ideals.100  At this time in history, there was a 
push toward public control of all aspects of government.  According to this rising mode 
of thought, in a democratic society, the populace, not an elite few, should have control 
over all aspects of government, including, of course, the judiciary.101  Accordingly, 
Jacksonians sought to establish state judicial elections so that the general populace could 
exercise broader control of public office, wrest power from the politically influential,102 
increase judicial accountability,103 and, particularly in the southern states, break up the 
stronghold that white males had on the judiciary.104  From 1846 to 1860, Jackson’s vision 
gained strength and America saw nineteen states adopt constitutions providing for 
judicial elections.105  During the 1860s, twenty-two states elected their judges.106  
Currently, thirty-nine states elect some or all of the members of their bench.107 
¶32 Although judicial elections were fueled and forged by worthy ideals, such as pure 
democracy and judicial accountability, the results and consequences of judicial elections 
have, in practice, turned out to be much worse than the method devised by the founders.  
To be sure, by the early 1900s, the problems of judicial elections began to rear their ugly 
heads, and those states that adopted and employed judicial elections began to see, among 
other problems, an “emergence of strong political party machines in large urban areas and 
various states [that] resulted in political bosses effectively hand-picking incompetent 
political hacks for judicial positions who then, through party-controlled elections, 
replaced otherwise competent nonpolitically favored judges.”108 Indeed, the judiciary, in 
                                                 
97 See Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures, and Issues, 49 U. MIAMI L. Rev. 1, 
5 (1994).  One commentator has noted that provisions in state constitutions, such as the Massachusetts 
Constitution’s provision for life tenure (championed by John Adams), may well have served as a model for 
Article III.  See Carlton, Jr., supra note 10, at 836; cf. Hiller B. Zobel, Judicial Independence and the Need 
to Please, JUDGES’ J., Fall 2001, at 5, 8 (quoting John Adams’s belief that judges should be “‘free, 
impartial, and independent as the lot of humanity will admit’”). 
98 See Grodin, supra note 9, at 1971. 
99 Id. 
100 Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to that Man Behind the Robe: Judicial Elections, the First 
Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301, 311-12 (2003). 
101 See, e.g., Rorie Sherman, Is Mississippi Turning?, 11 NAT’L L.J. 1 (1989). 
102 See Dimino, supra note 100, at 310. 
103 See Sobocinski, supra note 4, at 201. 
104 Id. 
105 James E. Lozier, The Missouri Plan A/K/A Merit Selection is the Best Solution for Selecting Michigan’s 
Judges?, 75 MICH. B.J. 918, 919 (1996). 
106 Id. 
107 See Sobocinski, supra note 4, at 201-02. 
108 Lozier, supra note 105, at 918; see also Kurt E. Scheuerman, Rethinking Judicial Elections, 72 OR. L. 
REV. 459, 466 (1993) (“The innovation of electing judges soon proved to contain its share of problems.  
Political machines began to control the selection of judges through the nomination process, and elections 
became rubber stamps of the machine’s selections.  This led to the creation of a politically responsive, yet 
at times incompetent, judiciary.”). 
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the words of one commentator, was seen as “corrupt, unethical, unqualified, and 
incompetent.”109 
¶33 Since the early 1900s, the problems of judicial elections have steadily worsened, 
and this method of placing judges on the bench has become increasingly dangerous.  As 
the Seat G election illustrates, the problems of judicial elections now pervade all forms of 
dispute resolution in the states; in both criminal and civil actions, no claim brought in 
state court is free from the problems inherent in judicial elections. 
¶34 In contemplating the problems associated with judicial elections, consider two state 
elections in Texas and Tennessee, along with Justice O’Connor’s subsequent concurrence 
in White.  These two elections—one a popular partisan election and one a Missouri plan 
election, respectively—illustrate some of the many problems associated with judicial 
elections.  Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in White points out how this method of 
placing judges on the bench threatens the independence of the courts.  The Texas and 
Tennessee examples are, of course, by no means exhaustive, and one can find numerous 
other state elections that mirror those of Texas and Tennessee.110 
¶35 In anticipation of the 1994 Texas judicial elections, after the highest criminal court 
in Texas had reversed a conviction in a highly publicized capital case, the former 
chairman of the state Republican Party made a state-wide call for the Republicans to take 
over the court.111  During the election, the Republicans provided a one-sided and distorted 
view of the Texas Criminal Court’s holding to the voting public, stirred up public anger 
and ultimately succeeded in placing numerous Republicans on the bench, including Judge 
Stephen Mansfield.112  Judge Mansfield, who had only been a member of the Texas bar 
for two years, had been disciplined in Florida for practicing law without a license, and 
who had completely misrepresented his academic writing on criminal law to the voting 
public, ousted a much more qualified incumbent judge, a former prosecutor of twelve 
years who had the support of the criminal bar.113  Judge Mansfield, undoubtedly less 
qualified than the incumbent, ran his campaign solely on the basis of the highly 
publicized capital case on which the Republican Party focused and misrepresented to the 
voting public.114  To no one’s surprise, there was little discussion of Judge Mansfield’s 
qualifications, such as his experience, publications, discipline, or ethics. 
¶36 In the 1994 Tennessee Supreme Court election, Justice Penny White was appointed 
to the Tennessee Supreme Court by the Governor to fill an existing vacancy on the high 
court.115  Justice White was subject to a retention vote in 1996.116  Just prior to the 
retention election, Justice White concurred in a decision reversing the death sentence of a 
                                                 
109 Rachel Paine Caufield, How the Pickers Pick: Finding a Set of Best Practices for Judicial Nominating 
Commissions, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 163, 168 (2007). 
110 See Roy A. Schotland, Financing Judicial Elections, 2000: Change and Challenge, 2001 L. REV. 
M.S.U.-D.C.L. 849, 881 (2001) (noting that the problems of judicial elections occur in numerous states). 
111 See, e.g., Janet Elliot & Richard Connelly, Mansfield: The Stealth Candidate; His Past Isn’t What It 
Seems, TEX. LAW, Oct. 3, 1994, at 1. 
112 See generally id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 See generally Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence of State 
Supreme Courts in an Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1133 (1997). 
116 See B. Michael Dann & Randall M. Hansen, National Summit on Improving Judicial Selection: Judicial 
Retention Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1429, 1434 (2001).  The case was State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18 
(Tenn. 1996). 
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criminal defendant in a highly publicized case.117  Although the decision was well 
grounded in law,118 and despite the fact that no one (Tennessee Supreme Court Justices 
included) enjoys giving or would ever want to give special treatment to a murderer, 
Tennessee Governor Don Sundquist criticized and distorted119 the decision to the voting 
public.  A special interest group simultaneously launched a smear campaign against 
Justice White in the 1996 election and completely misled the voting public with respect 
to Justice White’s concurrence.120  Justice White, with little time and few resources to 
combat the Governor’s attacks and the wealthy special interest ads in the news, lost the 
election.121  After less than two years on the bench, Justice White, on the basis of a single, 
legally justifiable decision, was gone.  Her qualifications, her accomplishments, her 
mental acuity, and her judicial temperament were of no relevance to the voting public.  
Justice White’s concurrence, which her opponent utterly distorted, was the sole criterion 
by which she was measured. 
¶37 The lessons of the Texas and Tennessee judicial elections are clear: if a judge 
wishes to keep her seat on the bench in a state where judicial elections are employed, she 
must consider the popular views of her constituents, even if that means sacrificing 
constitutional guarantees for the vicissitudes of popular politics.  Regardless of 
qualifications or abilities, a judge who issues a single unpopular decision that goes 
against the ideals of a special interest or political group may face strong opposition that 
may lead to that judge’s removal.  Further, unqualified candidates who are wealthy, have 
wealthy backing, or who can potentially generate campaign money (a factor which, as 
Justice O’Connor pointed out in White, is completely unrelated to judicial capacity)122 
will likely run for and win a seat on the bench over other more qualified candidates.  
Judges who are ultimately successful in obtaining office must not only consider the 
public’s views when issuing their legal decisions, but also be particularly cognizant of the 
interests of donors or money players who can influence the public perception of their 
views or record in the next election.  Last, judicial elections—with their attendant 
fundraising, campaign rhetoric, and smear tactics—have lowered the status and respect of 
the court to the same level of a typical political campaign, where rhetoric and confusion, 
not information or honest and thoughtful consideration of the candidates, predominates. 
¶38 After the election debacles in Texas, Tennessee, and elsewhere, the United States 
Supreme Court heard and decided White,123 a case that dealt with speech restrictions 
placed upon judicial candidates in Minnesota.  Justice O’Connor, concurring with the 
majority decision that struck down Minnesota’s ban on certain aspects of judicial election 
                                                 
117 Id.  In sum, the Odom court held that when various errors occurred during the penalty phase, a new 
sentencing was required.  Id. 
118 See Penny J. White, Breaking the Most Vulnerable Branch: Do Rising Threats to Judicial Independence 
Preclude Due Process in Capital Cases?, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 123, 138-39 (1999) (discussing 
merits and justification of the Odom decision). 
119 See Chief Justice Joseph E. Lambert, Contestable Judicial Elections: Maintaining Respectability in the 
Post-White Era, 94 KY. L.J. 1, 11 (2005-06) (noting that Justice White was defeated because of a 
“profound distortion of her death penalty views”). 
120 See generally Dann & Hansen, supra note 116, at 1434. 
121 Id. 
122 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 789 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
123 Id at 788. 
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speech, wrote separately to point out the many problems associated with judicial 
elections.124 
¶39 Justice O’Connor’s concurrence brilliantly points out the numerous problems 
inherent in judicial elections.  The White opinion is a breath of fresh air from the high 
court, particularly when considering the disturbing judicial elections just discussed in 
Texas, Tennessee, and other states.  It is also interesting to note that White was passed 
down after years of legal commentary and numerous symposia condemning the use of 
judicial elections,125 along with various declarations from the ABA concluding 
likewise.126  Further, it is noteworthy that, although the question in White did not deal 
directly with the question of the propriety of judicial elections (only speech limitations 
placed on judicial candidates),127 Justice O’Connor took the time and energy to write a 
separate concurrence identifying the problems with judicial elections.  It seems clear that, 
in light of the timing and context of her comments, Justice O’Connor was trying to send a 
powerful and clear message to the states regarding judicial elections. 
¶40 In her concurrence discussing the problems of judicial elections, Justice O’Connor 
first noted that judicial elections compromise a judge’s impartiality.128  Specifically, she 
stated that if “judges are subject to regular elections they are likely to feel that they have 
at least some personal stake in the outcome of every publicized case.  Elected judges 
cannot help being aware that if the public is not satisfied with the outcome of a particular 
case, it could hurt their reelection prospects.”129  Justice O’Connor went on to explain that 
even if judges did not pay attention to popular passions, and even if the vicissitudes of 
popular politics did not compromise judicial impartiality, judicial elections create the 
perception that judges could be influenced by popular views, and such a perception is, in 
and of itself, dangerous and erodes the public confidence.130 
¶41 Secondly, Justice O’Connor noted the problems involved with judicial 
campaigning.131  In doing so, she noted that campaigning, a characteristic that is 
“unrelated to judicial skill,” may encourage unqualified candidates who are wealthy to 
run for judicial office.132  In other words, judicial elections may attract incompetent or 
inferior legal minds to the bench.  Not only does campaigning lead to less qualified 
candidates, it is also problematic because “relying on campaign donations may leave 
                                                 
124 Id. at 788-96. 
125 See generally Phillips, supra note 5 (opening article for symposium by Ohio State); Eule, supra note 13; 
see also Symposium, Judicial Review and Judicial Independence, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 737 (1998); 
Symposium, A Symposium on Judicial Independence, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 703 (1997).  Other events 
include the University of Tulsa’s 1998 symposium entitled: “Judicial Independence—A Public Education 
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sponsored by the American Public Philosophy Institute and was entitled “Reining in Judicial Imperialism: 
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Reality, 36 JUDGES’ J. 8 (1997); Symposium, Judicial Independence: An Introduction, 80 JUDICATURE 155 
(1997). 
126 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 11. 
127 See White, 536 U.S. at 765. 
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129 Id. at 788-89. 
130 Id. at 788. 
131 Id. at 789. 
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judges feeling indebted to certain parties or interest groups.”133  Once again, even if a 
judge isn’t beholden or influenced by campaign contributions, the mere perception of 
influence is sufficient, in and of itself, to undermine the public’s confidence.134 
¶42 Justice O’Connor’s observations regarding the evils of judicial elections are 
pointed and informative when considering the Texas and Tennessee judicial elections 
discussed supra.  Indeed, in the Texas case, given that Judge Mansfield received so much 
support from the Republican Party, it is likely that he will feel beholden to the 
Republican Party and their interests when ruling on future cases, lest the Texas 
Republicans call upon the party to remove Judge Mansfield in the next election.  
Likewise, in Tennessee, it is difficult to believe that, given the fate of Justice White, a 
future Tennessee Supreme Court Justice will issue a decision that works against 
Governor Sundquist’s views or those of any other wealthy special interest group.  If 
nothing else, it would appear to the public that courts would consider these outside 
factors, and the mere appearance of such impropriety is sufficient to lower the esteem of 
the courts in the public’s eyes.  Consider also the Texas election in light of Justice 
O’Connor’s views regarding judicial campaigning.  In Texas, Judge Mansfield—an 
individual with much less judicial experience than the incumbent judge, no significant 
academic writing experience, and who concealed disciplinary action taken against him—
replaced a much more qualified incumbent who had the support of the criminal bar. 
¶43 Having briefly traced the genesis of judicial elections, from their inception to their 
current status, and having elaborated upon a variety of the problems and views 
denouncing this method of placing judges on the bench—from the United States Supreme 
Court135 to the world of academics136—as well as having discussed two recent examples 
of disastrous state elections in which incumbents were ousted for issuing unpopular, yet 
legally justifiable criminal decisions, this article now turns to the Seat G election. 
¶44 The Seat G election is significant because it represents the first major judicial 
election in which an incumbent justice was ousted on the basis of a single, unpopular civil 
decision.  As such, this election demonstrates that if judges wish to keep their jobs, they 
must now make all of their legal decisions with an eye toward public sentiment (much to 
the joy of a variety of newspapers, Governor Sundquist, and Tom DeLay, no doubt) and 
the next election.  Given that judges are being ousted for unpopular decisions in both civil 
and criminal decisions, it is imperative that states, now, more than ever, abandon judicial 
elections. 
¶45 To fully and fairly understand the Seat G election and its implications, one must 
appreciate the context in which the election occurred as well as comprehend the 
circumstances that led up to this groundbreaking judicial race.  Below is an account of the 
Seat G election, beginning with the controversial Nevada Supreme Court decision in 
Guinn.  This section begins by discussing the circumstances surrounding Guinn and the 
majority’s opinion in the case.  The discussion then turns to the Seat G election and how 
it presents a new and even more dangerous threat to judicial independence.  This section 
concludes with a look at SJR2 and Section 22 of the Nevada Constitution (which SJR2 
                                                 
133 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 790 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
134 Id. at 788. 
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amended), Nevada’s response to the judicial elections, and a discussion of why the 
Nevada legislature should amend Section 22 during the next legislative session. 
A. Guinn v. Nevada State Legislature 
¶46 Guinn came to the high court of Nevada (the high court did not go to Guinn—an 
important fact to remember)137 in the midst of a legislative crisis and a political stalemate.  
But for the court’s intercession in this crisis, Nevada’s public school system would have 
collapsed.  “Schools ha[d] not been funded for the upcoming school year.  Teachers ha[d] 
not been hired.  Educational programs ha[d] been eliminated.  Planning for the academic 
year [was] not possible, and the state’s bond rating may [have] been jeopardized.”138  
Indeed, had this legislative standoff in Nevada continued and the court not interceded, 
there would have been dire consequences for Nevada’s children. 
¶47 In Guinn, the Nevada legislature, which is responsible for funding education under 
the Nevada Constitution, could not agree upon the amount of funds to be appropriated to 
education;139 specifically, the legislature failed to balance the State budget by the end of 
the legislative session.140  As a result, Nevada’s public education system faced a 
meltdown.141  Even after the legislature called two special sessions to resolve the crisis, it 
still could not agree on a budget.142  Finally, in an attempt to resolve the crisis, the 
Governor petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus, asking the Nevada Supreme Court 
to order the legislature to perform its constitutional duty to approve a budget for 
education so that the legislature could provide the children of Nevada with an 
education.143 
¶48 The Guinn court was asked to examine and reconcile several provisions of the 
Nevada Constitution ostensibly pitted against each other: Article 9, Section 2, which 
requires the legislature to approve a balanced budget; Article 11, Section 6, which 
mandates that the legislature fund public education; and Article 4, Section 18(2), which 
requires a two-thirds supermajority to generate or increase public revenue to fund those 
appropriations.144  In the end, the Guinn court (in light of the constitutional mandate 
requiring the legislature to provide an education to the children of Nevada) ordered the 
legislature to fulfill its constitutional obligation to approve a budget for education and 
balance the budget.  Specifically, the high court held that Article 4, Section 18(2) of the 
Nevada Constitution must yield to Article 11, Section 6 and Article 9, Section 2 of the 
Nevada Constitution, which require the Nevada legislature to fund education and approve 
                                                 
137 See Jenkins, supra note 76, at 126.  Judge Jenkins, in discussing the term “judicial activism,” points out 
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138 Guinn v. Nevada State Legislature, 71 P.3d 1269, 1274 (Nev. 2003), overruled in part by Nevadans for 
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140 See id. at 1272. 
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144 Id. (noting that the court must resolve the “tension between the legislature’s constitutional obligation to 
fund public education and the constitutional provisions requiring a simple majority to enact appropriations 
bills but a two-thirds majority to generate or increase public revenue to fund those appropriations”). 
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a balanced budget, respectively.145  To address the legislature’s impasse and the failure of 
the two special sessions, the Court held that the legislature could bypass Article 4, 
Section 18(2), and approve the educational budget by a simple majority.146  As a 
consequence, the legislature, not the court, imposed a tax via a simple majority vote to 
raise money for public education.  Funding was granted, and disaster was avoided. 
¶49 After the decision in Guinn, various legislators filed a petition for rehearing with 
the Nevada Supreme Court.147  The petition was denied.148  Unsatisfied with this result, 
these same legislators attacked the Guinn decision in federal court, once again failing.  
The legislators ultimately filed a petition for writ of certiorari and this, too, was rejected 
by the Supreme Court of the United States.149  Consistent with both the Nevada state and 
federal court decisions, commentators examining Guinn have concluded that the decision 
was legally sound.150 
¶50 After rendering its decision in Guinn, the Nevada Supreme Court came under 
heavy fire from the media151 and special interest groups.  Although it was the legislature, 
not the court, that ultimately raised the taxes of the Nevadans, and despite the fact that 
numerous legal scholars have concluded the Guinn decision was sound152 and the United 
States Supreme Court denied review of Guinn153 (for whatever reason, we do not know 
for sure), the local media and various special interest groups preyed upon the decision,154 
distorted the holding to the public,155 and created a significant amount of unwarranted 
public upheaval and disdain for the court.156  Indeed, the media and special interest 
groups’ distortion of the decision was so pervasive and malignant that Justice Agosti, the 
                                                 
145 Id. at 1276. 
146 Id. 
147 76 P.3d 22 (Nev. 2003). 
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149 The petition alleged that the Guinn decision violated the Republican Guarantee Clause, the Due Process 
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following fact: there was no good alternative available to the court in the case.”). 
151 See Agosti, supra note 9, at 881; see generally, Ralston, supra note 19. 
152 See generally Popkin, supra note 150; see also Johnson, supra note 150. 
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validity of the decision, the denial is probative.  But see Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 
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author of the Guinn opinion, likened their coverage and evaluation of Guinn to 
propaganda.157 
B. Seat G 
¶51 Four years after the issuance of the Guinn opinion, Justice Becker, who concurred 
in the Guinn decision, was set to run for reelection. Justice Becker was the only justice 
from the Guinn court who faced reelection.  The 2006 Seat G election pitted Becker 
against then-District Judge Nancy Saitta.  Judge Saitta’s qualifications, like those of 
Judge Mansfield from Texas, were less than impressive.  She was the most reversed 
District Court Judge in Nevada and an extremely inefficient lower court judge,158 who 
had not published a single opinion159 or academic article.  Further, at the time of this 
article’s publication, she has not published a single academic article.160  Moreover, not 
only was Saitta unqualified for the Supreme Court, but she was also tied to several 
wealthy special interest groups who sought to oust Justice Becker.161  Additionally, she 
had, in the past, presided over and ruled in favor of several controversial cases involving 
campaign contributors.162  Much like the elections in Texas and Tennessee, however, 
                                                 
157 Id. 
158 See Matt Pordum, Nevada Judges Do Well When Cases Are Reviewed in Nevada, LAS VEGAS SUN, Apr. 
19, 2006, at A1.  These numbers are based on a thirty-two month study conducted by a University of 
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159 Then-Judge Saitta did have two unpublished opinions, which were found on Westlaw: Wozniak v. 
Sahara Outpatient Surgery Ctr. Ltd., No. A457045, 2004 WL 3244352 (D. Nev. June 30, 2004) and 
Purrier v. Chemical Lime Comp. of Arizona, No. A429375, 2004 WL 3203140 (D. Nev. Sept. 8, 2004).  
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she did author these unpublished opinions herself, a review of both opinions (which, again, are each 
approximately one page in length) reveals that neither of these opinions engage in a factual statement of the 
case, a statement of the law, or provide a thoughtful analysis of the issues involved. 
160 A Lexis and Westlaw search revealed no publications—although my research did uncover one law 
review article that recounted a symposium discussion in which Saitta participated.  See Symposium, 
Judicial Selection and Evaluation, 4 NEV. L.J. 61 (2003).  This is not, however, a publication.  Justice 
Becker had, on the other hand, published several hundred opinions in her capacity as a justice on the 
Nevada Supreme Court.  Although Saitta was not a justice and Becker was (and thus had the opportunity to 
publish), the point is that, at the time of the election, Becker had significant writing experience and Saitta 
did not.  Because writing and publishing opinions is integral to the position of a judge, particularly a 
Supreme Court justice, it is clear why publications are a probative factor in assessing the qualifications of a 
candidate.  Indeed, recognizing the importance of publications to a potential nominee to the bench, the 
American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary (a committee that rates federal 
judgeships) looks at a nominee’s prior publications in evaluating the quality of a potential judge.  The more 
publications the potential judge has, the better his or her rating.  Cf. generally, Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu 
Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 23 (2004). 
161 See Jeff German, Far Right Targets Justice Becker: Supreme Court Vote on Tax Increase Was Right 
Thing To Do, She Says, LAS VEGAS SUN, Oct. 15, 2007, at A1. 
162 See Goodman & Rempel, supra note 6, at B5. 
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qualifications did not matter in this election as Judge Saitta put the entire focus of the 
election on the Guinn case.163 
¶52 Throughout the Seat G race, Saitta continued with the propaganda that the media 
had fed the voting public regarding Guinn.  Indeed, Saitta—without mentioning or 
otherwise alluding to the fact that Guinn came to the Nevada Supreme Court under dire 
circumstances, without even referencing the fact that it was the legislature, not the court, 
who was responsible for the tax increase, and without even bringing up the fact that the 
United States Supreme Court had declined to review the Nevada Supreme Court’s 
decision—accused Justice Becker of “judicial activism.”164  Moreover, in a statement of 
utter boldness and irresponsibility, Saitta claimed that the Guinn court had “ignored the 
Constitution,”165 as if a justice would, or could, in any sense of the term “ignore,” to wit, 
“refrain from noticing or recognizing”166 a constitutional provision that lies at the very 
heart of the matter under consideration.167 
¶53 In the end, Saitta—despite being obviously less qualified—ousted Justice Becker, 
an established and solid jurist.168  Saitta’s campaign against Becker, which was based 
largely on a single, politically unpopular decision that had been previously maligned in 
the media, helped Saitta win Seat G.169  It appears that for the first time in American 
history, a sitting State Supreme Court justice was ousted on the basis of a single, legally 
justifiable, yet politically unpopular, opinion in a civil decision. 
¶54 Seat G teaches several important lessons regarding the dangers of judicial elections.  
These unfortunate lessons wonderfully illustrate the new dangers which judicial elections 
now pose to liberty in America and demonstrate why states should do everything within 
their power to abandon this flawed method of placing judges on the bench.  After this 
section discusses the lessons of Seat G, it discusses SJR2 and Article VI, Section 22 of 
the Nevada Constitution (which SJR2 amended), and demonstrates how the amendments 
to Section 22 are insufficient to promote judicial independence and to protect Nevada 
from yet again experiencing the problems of judicial elections.  Ergo, this article urges 
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19-Thu-2006/election/10204974.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2008). 
166 See Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ignore (last visited Jan. 22, 2008). 
167 Of course, this article is not suggesting that Guinn was not problem free, nor is it saying that Guinn was 
not a valid case to be discussed by the candidates in the Seat G election.  Indeed, all of Justice Becker’s 
cases (past cases, that is) were fair game for debate.  I argue that consistent with fairness, the Guinn holding 
should have been discussed openly, fairly, and without the rhetoric.  Moreover, the case should have been 
explored and framed in the larger context of the entire record of Justice Becker, and the public should have 
been given a full picture of Justice Becker’s decisions regarding her views and method of Constitutional 
interpretation.  The dangers of focusing on a single case need not be explored, and it is rather self-evident 
that such a tactic would be extremely harmful to not only a candidate, but also to the voting public who is 
to decide who sits on the bench. 
168 See Packer, supra note 165. 
169 See Carri Geer Thevenot, Supreme Court’s Becker Falls to Saitta; Douglas Retains Seat, LAS VEGAS 
REV.-J., Nov. 8, 2006, at 5B, available at http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2006/Nov-08-Wed-
2006/news/10690397.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2008).  Although Thevenot’s article mentions that Becker 
had made an unpopular decision in an eminent domain case, this decision, when compared to what was said 
about the Guinn decision by the media, it received little to no attention.  It is for this reason that I believe 
that the Guinn decision was the cause of Justice Becker’s eventual fall. 
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the Nevada legislature to amend Section 22 in the next legislative session to eliminate all 
forms of judicial elections in Nevada. 
¶55 The first (and most important) lesson of Seat G is that in states where judicial 
elections are held, if judges want to keep their jobs, they are not free to make even a 
single, politically unpopular, yet legally justifiable decision.  Indeed, it illustrates that 
those judges who do make socially or politically unpopular decisions, regardless of the 
legal justification, do so at their own peril.170  This fact is alarming, and one cannot 
overemphasize the danger of this occurrence.  As the ABA has stated: 
Never is there more potential for judicial accountability being distorted 
and judicial independence being jeopardized than when a judge is 
campaigned against because of a stand on a single issue or even in a single 
case.  In such a situation, it is particularly important for lawyers to support 
the judicial process and the rule of law.171
¶56 The Seat G election is even more alarming, however, because it demonstrates that 
the problems of judicial elections have now spread into the civil realm of dispute 
resolution.  Indeed, it appears that Seat G is the first major judicial election in which an 
incumbent was ousted on the basis of an unpopular civil decision.172  This expansion into 
the civil realm of dispute resolution, in conjunction with the unprecedented attacks that 
the judiciary faces, should strike terror in the reader—as it did with federalists173 and anti-
federalists.174  Indeed, Seat G teaches that now, no dispute or individual right brought 
before a state court—civil or criminal—is safe from the pressures and dangers that 
judicial elections exert.  This fact undoubtedly represents the most dangerous period of 
judicial elections in the history of America. 
¶57 In the Seat G election, it was Justice Becker’s unpopular concurrence in Guinn and 
the subsequent distortion of that decision to the voting public that directly caused Becker 
to lose her seat to the less-qualified Saitta.  This reality seriously jeopardizes the rights of 
every citizen and undermines the validity of the legal system as a whole.  Indeed, it 
teaches that the law may take a back seat to popular politics.  Systems of appointment 
that create this type of scenario should be shunned.  Indeed, as Justice Stevens stated, “it 
was ‘never contemplated that the individual who has to protect our individual rights 
would have to consider what decision would produce the most votes.’”175 
                                                 
170 See supra notes 109-121 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial elections in Texas and 
Tennessee in which a sitting judge was ousted on the basis of an unpopular legal decision). 
171 See TASK FORCE ON LAWYERS’ POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS, AM. BAR ASS’N, 2 REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS: REGARDING CONTRIBUTIONS TO JUDGES AND JUDICIAL CANDIDATES 6 (1998) 
(emphasis added). 
172 As discussed in footnote 23, supra, some have speculated that Justice David Lanphier of the Nebraska 
Supreme Court may have been defeated in 1996 after he authored a unanimous opinion invalidating a term-
limits amendment to the state constitution.  See Entin, supra note 23, at 523-24.   However, Justice 
Lanphier was likely ousted because of several rulings that overturned second-degree murder convictions.  
See Reid, supra note 23, at 70-71. 
173 See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. 
174 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
175 See Bright, supra note 1 (citing Justice John Paul Stevens, Opening Assembly Address, ABA Ann. 
Meeting 12 (Aug. 3, 1996)). 
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¶58 Second, the Seat G race fortifies Justice O’Connor’s176 observation that popular 
elections will attract only those who are wealthy, or who have the ability to run an 
expensive campaign, and thereby potentially decrease the likelihood that the most 
qualified candidates will run for and be elected to the bench.  As discussed earlier, Saitta 
is much like Judge Mansfield in the Texas judicial election discussed supra: she was the 
most reversed judge in Nevada and an extremely inefficient lower court judge,177 with no 
academic publications or published legal opinions.178  Nonetheless, Saitta had the 
powerful backing of various wealthy special interest groups who sought to oust Justice 
Becker.179  Indeed, it is well known that Saitta was approached by certain powerful and 
wealthy attorneys in Nevada who wanted to remove Becker because she had issued 
decisions that were contrary to a variety of the interests they frequently represented.180  In 
this election, it was Saitta’s capacity to use wealthy special interest groups—an ability 
unrelated to judicial skill181—that allowed her to win the race, not her qualifications. 
¶59 Third, Seat G illustrates the dangers associated with judges being beholden to 
campaign contributors.  As Justice O’Connor noted in White, judges who solicit and 
receive campaign contributions for a judicial election may feel indebted to those 
campaign contributors.182  This is a very real danger in Nevada; indeed, prior to the Seat 
G election, the L.A. Times issued articles that rocked Nevada, detailing instances in which 
Saitta heard cases involving campaign contributors and ruled favorably for those 
campaign contributors.183  Moreover, Saitta is now indebted to the group of powerful 
interest groups in Nevada who financed her campaign.184  In light of these facts, can one 
seriously argue that if an issue arises before the Nevada Supreme Court that involves an 
issue in which one of Saitta’s large campaign donors has a significant interest, Saitta 
would be independent?185  The mere fact that she took money, let alone large amounts of 
money, from such donors requires an answer in the negative.  At best, these facts create 
the glaring appearance of being beholden to such contributors. 
¶60 Fourth, the Seat G election and its attendant campaign rhetoric illustrate how 
judicial campaigns are becoming “nosier, nastier and costlier,”186 and demonstrate how 
                                                 
176 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
177 See Pordum, supra note 158. 
178 See supra notes 159-160 and accompanying text.  Saitta was not wholly without experience prior to her 
election to the high court, however.  Prior to the Seat G race Saitta was a district court judge in Nevada and 
a municipal court judge in Las Vegas prior to that.  See Washoe County, Candidate Information, supra note 
164.  However, as discussed earlier, Saitta was the most reversed district judge and had not published a 
single opinion as a judge, nor had she published a single academic article.  Because legal writing is one of 
the most important skills a Supreme Court Justice must possess, Saitta’s lack of any scholarly or judicial 
writing as a judge is extremely disconcerting and demonstrates her lack of qualifications.  See supra notes 
159-160 and accompanying text. 
179 See German, supra note 161; see also Sam Skolnik, Who Owes Whom is Supreme Theme: Becker, Saitta 
Race is Rife With Accusations, LAS VEGAS SUN, Aug. 27, 2006, at A1. 
180 Id. 
181 See White, 536 U.S. at 789. 
182 Id. 
183 See Goodman & Rempel, supra note 6, at B5. 
184 See German, supra note 161; see also Skolnik, supra note 179. 
185 White, 536 U.S. at 788 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Anthony Champagne, Access to Justice: 
Can Business Coexist with the Civil Justice System?, 38 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 1483, 1512 (2005) (noting that 
judicial candidates, if they want to be elected or retained, must “show that they are friendly to the goals of 
the group”). 
186 David B. Rottman & Roy A. Schotland, What Makes Judicial Elections Unique?, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
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judicial elections are lowering the traditional respect for the courts and the rule of law.187  
In her campaign literature against Justice Becker in the Seat G race, Saitta told the voting 
public that the Nevada Supreme Court’s decisions in deciding Guinn “ignored”188 the 
Constitution and engaged in “judicial activism,”189 while simultaneously misrepresenting 
the Guinn decision to the public by feeding them a one-sided and oversimplified version 
of a rather complex case that was made under serious time-restraints and involved (and 
ultimately benefited) the education of the children of Nevada.190  Of course, as Justice 
Agosti noted, these statements were extreme, one-sided, and simply inaccurate.191  
Saitta’s statements were nothing more than typical political rhetoric.  Despite Saitta’s 
assertions to the contrary, there was no “judicial activism” in the Guinn decision, nor did 
the Nevada Supreme Court “ignore” the Nevada Constitution (a claim that is 
unconscionable when considering the fact that the disputed provisions of the Nevada 
Constitution are expressly discussed throughout the Guinn opinion).192 
¶61 Like many cases, the Guinn decision is not problem free.  However, the Nevada 
Supreme Court, in passing upon the merits of the case in the midst of a legislative 
emergency, was not active in soliciting, receiving, or deciding the case; to be sure, the 
court did not seek out the petition for a writ of mandamus.  Rather, the Court took what 
came, “and within the tradition of service and the boundaries of power and competency 
[did] the best [it could] to deal with questions put to [it] by others.”193  In Guinn, the 
Nevada Supreme Court knew that it had been handed a political hot potato when it 
received the petition from Governor Guinn and, in all reality, the high court probably 
would have rather avoided touching the question.  But, pursuant to its constitutional duty, 
it did not.  Neither Justice Becker, nor the Nevada Supreme Court for that matter, 
“ignored” the Constitution.  In fact, the court did just the opposite and tackled the 
difficult issue head-on. 
¶62 The provision that Saitta accused Justice Becker and the Nevada Supreme Court of 
“ignoring” is expressly discussed and analyzed numerous times in the Guinn opinion,194 
and no informed jurist, commentator, or responsible citizen could, after reading the 
opinion and giving it thoughtful consideration, ever conclude that the Guinn court was 
“activist,” or that the high court had “ignored” the Constitution.195  At best, even if Saitta 
did not agree with the Guinn opinion, concluding that the court was “activist” and had 
“ignored” the constitution is a contemptuous assertion, particularly in light of the United 
                                                                                                                                                 
1369, 1373 n.5 (2001) (quoting Richard Woodbury, Is Texas Justice For Sale?, TIME, Jan. 11, 1988, at 74). 
187 See Hon. Hugh Maddox, Taking Politics Out of Judicial Elections, 23 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 329, 335 
(1999) (noting that judicial elections have created a “dangerous decline in the public's faith in impartiality 
of the judicial branch of government”). 
188 See Nancy Saitta Website, supra note 164. 
189 Id. 
190 See Guinn v. Nevada State Legislature, 71 P.3d 1269, 1281 (Nev. 2003), overruled in part by Nevadans 
for Nev. v. Beers, 142 P.3d 339 (Nev. 2006). 
191 See Agosti, supra note 9, at 881. 
192 See generally Guinn, 71 P.3d at 1272. 
193 See Jenkins, supra note 76, at 293. 
194 See generally Guinn, 71 P.3d at 1272.  Given the explicit discussion of the Constitution in the opinion, it 
is beyond comprehension how one could ever contend that the Nevada Supreme Court ignored the 
Constitution. 
195 See Popkin, supra note 150, at 308-09; Johnson, supra note 150, at 491. 
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States Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari196 and the numerous academic articles opining 
otherwise.197 
¶63 Saitta’s campaign claims against Justice Becker were—to say the least—grossly 
distorted and “shameless[ly]”198 and unequivocally hurt the image and public respect for 
the Court.199  How can the public respect the judiciary when such blatant 
misrepresentations and nasty attacks are made in a judicial race?  The foregoing problems 
with Seat G illustrate how such campaign rhetoric destroys the traditional respect for the 
bench.  Indeed, the Seat G rhetoric and misrepresentations demonstrate why today’s 
public views judicial elections the same way as a typical political race: poorly.200 
¶64 Fifth, the Seat G election teaches a great deal about what the public can expect 
from candidates in future judicial elections.  Saitta’s record speaks for itself: she was the 
most reversed district judge in the State of Nevada;201 an extremely inefficient adjudicator 
of justice (as evidenced by the large backlog of cases, many of which reached back three 
years) with no legal or academic publications;202 an individual tied to wealthy special 
interests who wanted to oust Justice Becker;203 and a judge who presided over and 
rendered questionable rulings in favor of campaign contributors.204  Yet, despite her poor 
credentials, she won the election.  Noting this fact, it is likely that in future judicial 
elections the candidates, instead of focusing on relevant factors and responsibly 
campaigning, will engage in the same smear tactics and distortion as did Saitta.  Indeed, 
Seat G teaches candidates that if they shift the focus of the campaign and misrepresent 
selected issues, they may prevail despite a lack of experience, scholarly work, or poor 
legal record.  As such, those individuals who “covet higher office”205 will likely mimic 
such tactics instead of running campaigns that are truly focused on the issues and those 
qualities that are probative in assessing someone’s capacity to serve on the bench. 
C. SJR2 
¶65 After years of problems with judicial elections in Nevada, with the independence of 
Nevada courts hanging by a string, and after being embarrassed by recent news articles in 
the L.A. Times206 regarding the Seat G election, on February 13, 2007, several Nevada 
legislators introduced SJR2, seeking to amend the Nevada Constitution to eliminate 
popular judicial elections.  In sum, SJR2 was aimed at eliminating Nevada’s practice of 
popular elections and sought to replace this system with the “Missouri plan,” a practice 
whereby judges are appointed by the Governor (after being recommended by a 
nominating commission) and subject to a retention vote after six years, wherein a judicial 
                                                 
196 See Angle v. Legislature of Nev., 543 U.S. 1120 (2005) (denying petition for writ of certiorari). 
197 See Popkin, supra note 150, at 308-09; Johnson, supra note 150, at 491. 
198 See Ralston, supra note 19. 
199 See Maddox, supra note 187, at 335 (noting that judicial elections have created a “dangerous decline in 
the public’s faith in the impartiality of the judicial branch of government”). 
200 Id.; see also Caufield, supra note 109, at 168 (noting that judicial elections have caused the public to 
view the judiciary as “corrupt, unethical, unqualified, and incompetent”). 
201 See Pordum, supra note 158. 
202 See supra text accompanying note 160. 
203 See German, supra note 161; see also Skolnik, supra note 179. 
204 See Goodman & Rempel, supra note 6, at B5. 
205 Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 519 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
206 See Goodman & Rempel, supra note 6, at B5. 
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commission will issue a report for the public recommending whether to retain the justice 
or judge.207  SJR2 also mandates that those justices or judges who currently sit on the 
bench and desire to continue to serve in their office are also subject to a future retention 
vote and must declare their candidacy by July 11, 2011.208 
¶66 On March 8, 2007, the Nevada Judiciary Committee held hearings on SJR2.  
Various politicians, citizens, law professors, and groups testified for and against certain 
aspects of SJR2.  Senator William J. Raggio, one of the five senators who proposed SJR2 
(and who supported similar legislation in 1972 and 1998 that was defeated), testified at a 
hearing and explicitly discussed the underlying purposes of SJR2.  Below are the relevant 
excerpts from his testimony before the committee: 
Elections have become nasty, uncivil and subject to partisan politics. 
[J]udicial candidates [are] sitting in outer offices soliciting contributions 
from attorneys . . . . Recently, there was a series in the Los Angeles media 
which was termed an exposé of the judicial system in Clark County.  It 
gave examples of political solicitations and contributions alleged to have 
crossed the line. 
Too many special interest groups want to place undue pressure on the 
judiciary to follow their issues.  Some groups want to jail judges if they do 
not go along with what they perceive to be an appropriate decision.  
Judges should not live in fear or favor in making their decisions. 
[J]udges who have been appointed to fill vacancies in the [Nevada] 
process measure up better than many judges who are initially elected.209
¶67 SJR2, to no surprise, received a warm welcome from the Senate and Assembly 
judiciary committees, as well as both houses of the Nevada legislature.  SJR2 passed in 
both Houses with no substantive amendments and was sent for signature on May 31, 
2007.210  Not only was SJR2 treated well in the legislature, but SJR2 also received strong 
support from the Nevada populace, as evidenced by the assortment of groups, such as the 
Nevada State Bar, which supported the resolution.211 
¶68 Although SJR2 is a step in the right direction in bolstering judicial autonomy, the 
amendments SJR2 made to Article VI of the Nevada Constitution are fatally flawed and 
simply will not eliminate the problems Senator Raggio identified as driving the 
resolution.  Indeed, SJR2 should not include a retention vote provision.  One need only 
consider the judicial election debacle involving Justice Penny White on the Tennessee 
Supreme Court when considering the problems which will continue to attend judicial 
                                                 
207 S.J. Res. 2, 74th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2007). 
208 Id. 
209 See Nevada Legislature, Minutes of the Senate Committee on Judiciary, Mar. 8, 2007, 
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/74th/Minutes/Senate/JUD/Final/486.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2008). 
210 See Nevada Legislature, Bill History of SJR2, http://www.leg.state.nv.us/74th/Reports/history.cfm? 
DocumentType=8&BillNo=2 (last visited Jan. 22, 2008). 
211 See Nevada State Bar, White Paper, http://www.nvbar.org/pdf/sjr2whitepaper.pdf (last visited Jan 22, 
2008). 
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elections in Nevada unless Article VI, Section 22 of the Nevada Constitution is amended.  
The Tennessee Supreme Court race, remember, did not involve a popular vote; it 
involved a retention vote.212  Although Tennessee employed the Missouri plan and did 
not use popular elections (which is essentially identical to what SJR2 did to the Nevada 
Constitution), the Governor of Tennessee and various wealthy special interest groups in 
Tennessee were still able to run distorted campaigns against Justice White based solely 
on one socially unpopular, yet legally justifiable, decision.  And, in the end, Justice White 
was ousted. 
¶69 As a practical matter, the only real difference between Article VI, Section 22 as 
amended and Nevada’s previous method of popular elections is that under the new 
Article VI, Section 22, judges will be initially appointed to the bench by the Governor 
instead of being elected by popular vote.  But this difference does not make a difference.  
Indeed, the only benefit this change would bring would be to prevent inexperienced 
candidates (who were only there because of their wealth)213 from running and being 
elected to the bench.  Aside from this marginal benefit, however, every other problem 
Nevada experienced with popular judicial elections will remain under Article VI, Section 
22.  Judges will still solicit donations.  Judges will still run campaigns, truthful or not.  
Judges will still be beholden to campaign contributors.  As such, Article VI, Section 22, 
as it now reads, is a failure and will not protect and promote judicial independence as a 
whole and cannot cure the problems which Senator Raggio identified as driving the 
resolution.214  Indeed, because Nevada retained a retention vote in its appointment method 
for judgeships, Nevada will continue to see incumbents campaigning, incumbents 
soliciting contributions, and special interest and political groups mounting attacks on 
candidates. 
¶70 The foregoing realities demonstrate the dire need for the Nevada legislature to 
rethink and amend Section 22 of the Nevada Constitution to eliminate judicial elections 
completely.  Indeed, given the undeniable failure of the Missouri plan in those states that 
have adopted retention elections (e.g., Tennessee), it is imperative that the Nevada 
legislature rethink and rewrite Article VI, Section 22 so that the independence of 
Nevada’s judiciary can be bolstered and the problems that Senator Raggio identified may 
be eliminated. 
¶71 To eliminate the problems of judicial elections and bolster judicial independence, 
this article proposes that SJR2 be amended to delete the retention vote provision, and that 
Section 22 be rewritten to provide for: (1) Senate confirmation of nominees appointed by 
the Governor, (2) twelve-year judgeship terms,215 and (3) a determination that all 
                                                 
212 See generally Uelman, supra note 115. 
213 Cf. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788-89 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting 
that “[u]nless the pool of judicial candidates is limited to those wealthy enough to independently fund their 
campaigns, a limitation unrelated to judicial skill, the cost of campaigning requires judicial candidates to 
engage in fundraising.”). 
214 A retention vote means, of course, that there is no opposing candidate against whom to measure the 
incumbent—another flaw in an already flawed social experiment. 
215 Of course, in providing for fixed twelve-year terms, it would be preferable if all of the justices do not 
leave the court at the same time.  Indeed, given the complexity of the administrative aspects of a Supreme 
Court, it would be highly desirable to have several justices on the bench when new justices arrive, so that 
the new justices could learn the ropes, so to speak.  This issue presents a problem in the initial 
implementation of fixed twelve-year terms because if the twelve-year rule applies to all from the date of the 
amendment (which will hopefully be in 2008), the Nevada Supreme Court would have seven new justices 
in 2020.  Given the current composition of the court, however, it is likely that the court could develop some 
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justices/judges currently sitting on the bench prior to enactment of SJR2 are subject to 
SJR2’s provisions (i.e., if a judge was elected three years ago, she will have nine more 
years on the bench; if a judge was elected or re-elected one year ago, he or she will have 
eleven years on the bench, etc.).216  Specifically, I suggest that Sections 22 (1)-(9) be 
completely deleted and rewritten as follows: 
Section 22 
1.  Each Justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of Appeals, if 
established, or judge of the District Court, shall be appointed by the 
Governor, after being nominated by a nominating commission by and with 
the consent of a majority of all the members elected to the Senate, for the 
term of twelve (12) years each, with no reappointments thereafter, and the 
persons so appointed shall enter upon the discharge of the duties of their 
respective offices upon taking the oath of office prescribed by this 
Constitution.  Before sending the name of any person to the Senate for 
confirmation as the appointment of the Governor to a vacancy in any 
Judicial Office as aforesaid, the Governor shall, not less than ten (10) days 
before sending the name of such person to the Senate for confirmation, 
address a public letter to the President of the Senate informing him or her 
that he or she intends to submit to the Senate for confirmation as an 
appointment to such vacancy the name of the person he or she intends to 
appoint. 
2.  All Justices or Judges in office prior to enactment of Section 22(1)-(2) 
shall be subject to these provisions and shall be deemed in office for the 
                                                                                                                                                 
type of initial internal rule or agreement to provide for staggered departures.  Presently, the Nevada 
Supreme Court has two justices elected in 2007 (Justices Saitta and Cherry), three in 2004 (Justices 
Douglas, Hardesty, and Parraguire), one in 2003 (Justice Gibbons) and one in 1996 (Chief Justice Maupin).  
Worst case scenario, even if an internal rule could not be promulgated, the Nevada Legislature could 
simply create a section in Article VI that starts the twelve-year time period from the time in which the 
justice was initially appointed.  Thus, Justices Saitta and Cherry would leave in 2019, Justices Douglas, 
Hardesty and Parraguire would leave in 2016, Justice Gibbons in 2015.  Of course, this method would only 
be problematic for the Chief Justice, and the Nevada legislature could simply give him an initial extension 
for a period of time that they deem reasonable. 
216 At the early stages of implementation, it is possible that the Nevada Supreme Court may (depending on 
the current composition and the amount of time before amendments are adopted) be in a position whereby 
the Governor is able to stack the court with nominees from his party.  This fact, of course, may be cause for 
concern.  Ergo, if it turns out that this may be a reality at the time of the adoption of the amendments 
suggested above, the Nevada legislature may want to consider an addition to Section 22 of the Nevada 
Constitution that would eliminate the possibility that the court is packed with nominees of only one party.  
This issue is beyond the scope of this article, but the author suggests that, if this issue arises, the Nevada 
legislature consider provisions from other states that have dealt with this problem.  For example, in 
Delaware, the legislature addressed the problem by adding the following provision to the Constitution: 
Appointments to the office of the State Judiciary shall at all times be subject to all of the 
following limitations: First, three of the five Justices of the Supreme Court in office at the same 
time, shall be of one major political party, and two of said Justices shall be of the other major 
political party. 
DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
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amount of time the Justice or Judge has been in office since the most 
recent election or appointment. 217
¶72 By amending Section 22 as suggested above, judicial elections will be eliminated in 
Nevada, and so will the problems associated with this flawed and dangerous method.  To 
be sure, abolishing judicial elections from Nevada will not only eliminate the very real 
possibility that judges may look to the next election when rendering their legal decisions, 
but it will also remove the other serious problems discussed earlier, namely: (1) judicial 
campaigning, (2) judges soliciting contributions, and (3) special interests running 
campaigns against incumbents to have them removed for unpopular decisions.  As a 
result, the amendments that this article suggests to Article VI, Section 22 of the Nevada 
Constitution will create a system of judicial appointment whereby judges need not 
campaign or solicit contributions, and the potential for judges to feel beholden to wealthy 
special interest or political parties will be non-existent, thus allowing Nevada judges to 
make their decisions solely upon the rule of law and facts of the case. 
¶73 Not only will amending Section 22 of the Nevada Constitution as suggested above 
eliminate many of the problems with judicial elections and campaigning, but it will also 
provide a balanced method of appointment that addresses the concerns of having judges 
appointed by the executive branch.218  Indeed, this article’s suggestions will provide for 
the people, via their elected representatives, an opportunity to object to, or even prevent 
                                                 
217 This language was drawn, in large part, from Delaware’s Constitutional provision regarding judicial 
appointment.  See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (Governor appoints judges and justices, with advice and consent 
of the Senate, for twelve-year terms).  It also resembles constitutional provisions or laws that are in place in 
ten other states and the District of Columbia—all of which appoint judges to fixed terms with no retention 
votes.  See CONN. CONST. art. 5, § 2 (Governor nominates judges from a list that a judicial selection 
commission submits, for eight-year terms); HAW. CONST. art. VI, § 3. (Governor appoints judges, from a 
judicial selection commission's list of nominees and with consent of the Senate, for ten-year terms; judicial 
selection commission determines retention); ME. CONST. art. 5, pt. 1, § 8 (Governor nominates judicial 
officers, with confirmation by a committee from both houses of the legislature), art. 6, § 4 (judges hold 
office for seven-year terms); MD. CONST. art. 4, § 41D (Governor appoints district court judges, with 
advice and consent of the Senate, for ten-year terms); MASS. CONST. pt. 2, c. 2, § 1, art. 9 (Governor 
appoints all judicial officers, with advice and consent of the Governor’s Council), pt. 2, c. 3, art. I (judicial 
officers hold office during good behavior); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 46 (Governor and Council appoint 
judicial officers), pt. 2, art. 73 (judges hold office during good behavior); N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 6, paras. 1, 3 
(Governor appoints judges and justices, with confirmation by the Senate, for initial seven-year terms; upon 
reappointment judges and justices serve during good behavior); N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 2 (Governor appoints 
court of appeals judges, with advice and consent of the Senate, for fourteen-year terms); R.I. Const. art. X 
§§ 4-5 (1994) (Governor appoints superior court and district court justices, with confirmation by the 
Senate; justices hold office during good behavior); VT. CONST. ch. II, §§ 32, 34 (Governor appoints judges 
from a judicial nominating body's list of candidates, with advice and consent of the Senate, for six-year 
terms; general assembly votes for retention; general assembly can vote by simple majority to remove); D.C. 
CODE ANN. § 11-1501 (1995) (President selects judges from names that a commission recommends, with 
advice and consent of the Senate, for fifteen-year terms; judicial qualification commission reviews 
performance). 
218 Recently, Professors Calabresi and Lindgren called for the abolishment of life tenure for United States 
Supreme Court Justices and proposed, among other things, fixed eighteen-year terms for the Justices.  See 
Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 769 (2006).  In making this proposal, Professors Calabresi and Lindgren’s 
proposal revolves around the major concerns of life tenure, which they claim are “the Court’s resistance to 
democratic accountability, the increased politicization of the judicial confirmation process, and the 
potential for greater mental decrepitude of those remaining too long on the bench.”  Id. at 809.  The 
concerns of Professors Calabresi and Lindgren are applicable on the state level and are addressed by the 
proposed amendments that this article makes to Article VI, Section 22 of the Nevada Constitution. 
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certain judges who are clearly inexperienced, unqualified or perhaps radical, from sitting 
on the bench.219  Moreover, amending Section 22 of the Nevada Constitution as suggested 
above will limit the time during which judges are in office so as to avoid the potential 
that one political party will pack the court, as well as ensure that judges do not become 
entrenched in their positions.220  Additionally, fixed terms of twelve years will also ensure 
that judges will be afforded a sufficient amount of time to learn their duties as judges so 
that they may competently perform their judicial duties, while at the same time ensuring 
that the court will continuously be provided with fresh minds.221  Although disallowing 
reappointment may, in some cases, preclude a competent and talented jurist from serving 
on the bench in the future, it is unlikely that states would be unable to find new talent to 
sit on the bench every twelve years.  If issues arise as to reappointment and a state finds 
that it is best to allow for reappointment, it is always free to add a provision within its 
Constitution that would permit a judge or justice to be reappointed. 
¶74 If the retention portions of Section 22 of the Nevada Constitution are not deleted, 
Nevada will continue to experience virtually all of the same problems it has experienced 
with popular judicial elections.  Indeed, as the Justice Penny White debacle demonstrates, 
nothing in Section 22 of the new Nevada Constitution will prevent another Seat G-like 
catastrophe, and Nevada’s legislative attempt to bring respect and independence to the 
judiciary will fail and bring Nevada back to square one.  By amending Section 22 of the 
Nevada Constitution as recommended, Nevada can avoid the pitfalls and evils of judicial 
elections, and Nevada’s judicial branch of government can be freed from the problems of 
electing judges to the bench.  Further, amending Section 22 of the Nevada Constitution 
will, on a much broader level, bolster the independence of the judiciary across America, 
protect individual rights, and further the public’s respect for the judicial system as a 
whole. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶75 The Seat G election illustrates the dire need for states to abandon judicial elections 
in all forms.  Indeed, given that the ills associated with judicial elections have now spread 
into the civil realm of dispute resolution, this flawed Jacksonian method of placing judges 
on the bench is more dangerous than ever before. 
¶76 The framers of our federal Constitution “knew from history and experience that it 
was necessary to protect . . . against judges too responsive to the voice of higher 
                                                 
219 Cf. Owen Fiss, Between Supremacy and Exclusivity, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 187, 201 (2007) (“Although 
Justices of the Supreme Court are not elected, they owe their appointments to elected officials—the 
President and the Senate.”). 
220 One of the more prevalent concerns about life tenure is that judges will become too entrenched and 
resistant to new ideas.  Id. (noting that “life tenure of federal judges allows them to become entrenched and 
to exercise power long after the political regime that empowered them has disappeared”); see generally 
Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 218; Philip D. Oliver, Systematic Justice: A Proposed Constitutional 
Amendment to Establish Fixed, Staggered Terms for Members of the United States Supreme Court, 47 
OHIO ST. L.J. 799, 800 (1986).  This concern, however, has no real bite.  See Sheldon Goldman, Voting 
Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 491, 499 (1975) (noting that, in 
testing the “bureaucratic judicial arteries,” there was little evidence to support the hypothesis that tenured 
judges make irresponsible or poor legal decisions); Gregory C. Sisk, Andrew P. Morriss & Michael Heise, 
Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1377, 1486 (1998) (noting that life tenure does not cause senior federal judges to become entrenched 
in their ways and resistant to new ideas). 
221 See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 218, at 815-18.
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authority,”222 and they took great pains to ensure that the new Republic that they had 
formed had a strong and independent judiciary.223  The American experience with judicial 
elections, just like our forefathers’ painful experience with the King’s control of the 
judiciary in colonial times,224 counsels against judicial elections.  To be sure, judicial 
elections, as the Seat G election demonstrates, create a situation that may cause a judge to 
be “too responsive to the voice of higher authority”225 and threatens liberty and the 
public’s respect of the judicial institution.  When one considers the modern day evils of 
judicial elections and their threat to judicial independence, to individual rights and to the 
integrity and esteem of the court, in conjunction with the spread of these problems into 
the civil realm of dispute resolution and the harsh political landscape in which judges 
now operate, it is clear that Nevada, as well as all other states, should eliminate this 
“disgraceful”226 “scourge”227 from society. 
¶77 Given the increasing role of state courts in the protection of individual rights,228 it is 
imperative that states have methods of appointment in place that ensure that their judges 
are independent and free to make decisions without fear of public reprisal.  When a state 
has a system in place that permits a judge to be displaced because of a single unpopular 
decision, the entire process of orderly and peaceful adjudication of disputes is disrupted, 
as well as the entire foundation of our court system.229 
                                                 
222 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). 
223 See Cal. Chief Justice Ronald M. George, Challenges Facing an Independent Judiciary, 80 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1345, 1346 (2005). 
224 See supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text. 
225 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156. 
226 See TAFT, supra note 2, at 418. 
227 See Fordham & Husted, Jr., supra note 2, at 61 (quoting Proceedings and Debates of the Virginia State 
Convention of 1829-30, at 615-19 (1830)). 
228 See Bright & Keenan, supra note 10, at 768-69. 
229 In this final footnote, I would like to make it unequivocally clear that, just because judicial elections may 
produce judges who are less qualified, and just because judicial elections may produce judges who may feel 
compelled to consider outside influences in making legal decisions, I am not saying that all, or even the 
majority of elected judges on the state level are less qualified, or that all state judges disregard what the law 
compels them to do just because it may be politically unpopular.  Indeed, prior to my clerkship with Judge 
Greene on the federal level, I was a law clerk to Nevada State Senior District Judge James Brennan.  Judge 
Brennan was highly capable, bright, a published author, experienced, thoughtful, and did not consider, in 
all the cases on which I worked for him, any improper outside influences or otherwise jeopardize his 
independence as a judge.  Although Judge Brennan was a senior judge and therefore not subject to the same 
pressures as his colleagues who did not have senior status, I believe Judge Brennan represents the large 
majority of judges in Nevada. 
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